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THE PRESIDENT’S IMMIGRATION COURTS
Catherine Y. Kim*
ABSTRACT
Scholars have long documented the expansion of White House influence over
agency decision-making; for at least the past quarter-century, presidential
control has become the central feature of federal regulatory governance. Until
recently, such influence was understood to target the performance of purely
executive and legislative functions by agencies; commentators generally
assumed that political operatives refrained from interfering in agencies’
performance of adjudicative functions. The Trump Administration has cast
doubt on that assumption, deploying a series of reforms designed to reshape
administrative adjudication in our nation’s immigration courts. This Article
evaluates these emerging tools of political influence and their implications for
the ongoing debate over the legitimacy of presidential administration.
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INTRODUCTION
Over eleven million noncitizens reside in the United States without
authorization, either because they entered without inspection or because they
overstayed their visas.1 Additionally, an estimated 1.9 million noncitizens—the
majority of whom hold lawful immigrant status—are subject to deportation
based on post-entry conduct.2 President Trump has placed the deportation of
“illegals” at the center of his policy agenda, staking much of his political future
on the ability to remove these individuals from the country.3 One of his
administration’s core strategies has been aimed at “transforming [the]
institutional culture and infrastructure” of our nation’s immigration courts.4
These administrative courts, housed within the Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR),5 are staffed by “immigration
judges”6 congressionally vested with authority to adjudicate whether a given
noncitizen is “inadmissible” or “deportable,”7 and if so, whether the individual
nonetheless is eligible for, and warrants, discretionary relief from removal.8
1
Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population Stable for Half a Decade, PEW
RES. CENTER (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/unauthorized-immigrantpopulation-stable-for-half-a-decade/ (estimating 11.1 million unauthorized immigrants residing in the U.S. as of
2014).
2
Muzaffar Chishti & Michelle Mittelstadt, Unauthorized Immigrants with Criminal Convictions: Who
Might Be a Priority for Removal? MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Nov. 2016), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/
unauthorized-immigrants-criminal-convictions-who-might-be-priority-removal (estimating 1.9 million
noncitizens as removable criminal aliens, including approximately 820,000 unauthorized aliens).
3
See infra Section II.A.
4
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Backgrounder on EOIR Strategic Caseload Reduction Plan,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1016066/download.
5
6 U.S.C. § 521 (2012) (recognizing the Executive Office for Immigration Review). For descriptions of
adjudication within immigration courts, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION
REVIEW: AN AGENCY GUIDE 2 (2017) [hereinafter EOIR: AN AGENCY GUIDE], https://www.justice.gov/eoir/
page/file/eoir_an_agency_guide/download; AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, REFORMING THE
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND
PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 1–17 (2010) [hereinafter ABA, REFORMING THE
IMMIGRATION
SYSTEM],
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_
immigration/coi_complete_full_report.authcheckdam.pdf; Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and the
Adjudication of Immigration Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1501, 1505 (2010); Katie R. Eyer, Administrative Adjudication
and the Rule of Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 647, 669 (2008) (examining creation of new legal rules through
immigration adjudication).
6
8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2012) (defining “immigration judge”).
7
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012) (delegating to immigration judges the power to adjudicate
inadmissibility or deportability in removal proceedings); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012) (setting forth grounds for
inadmissibility); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012) (setting forth grounds for deportability).
8
The Immigration and Nationality Act provides an array of discretionary forms of relief from removal.
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012) (setting forth statutory prerequisites for discretionary grants of
asylum); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012) (setting forth prerequisites for discretionary waivers of crime-based
inadmissibility); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2012) (setting forth prerequisites for discretionary cancellation of removal).
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These agency officials in many cases also decide whether a detained alien may
be released pending the outcome of removal proceedings.9 In fiscal year 2016,
over 300,000 new proceedings were filed in immigration courts, to be
adjudicated by one of approximately 330 immigration judges sitting in 58 courts
across the nation.10 For millions of individuals facing deportation, immigration
courts are the final arbiter to determine whether they will be removed from, or
permitted to remain in, the United States.11
Immigration courts have long been the subject of criticism from both the
right and the left.12 Commentators have documented vast disparities in case
See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMM. L.J. 611, 612, 624, 640 (2006)
(discussing various forms of discretionary authority within immigration system).
9
Congress has provided that certain noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention pending removal
proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012) (noncitizens subject to crime-based removal); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)
(2012) (arriving or recently-arrived noncitizens without documentation or with fraudulent documents); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226a(a)(1) (2012) (suspected terrorists). For noncitizens exempt from these provisions, detention decisions
are made in the first instance by the enforcement officers and prosecutors within the Department of Homeland
Security. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(b)(1)–(2), 287.5(a)–(c) (2018). Once charges have been filed in immigration court,
a detained alien may request a bond rehearing before the immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1),
1003.19(a)–(f) (2018). For an empirical analysis of bond determinations made in immigration courts, see Emily
Ryo, Detained: A Study of Immigration Bond Review, 50 L. & SOC’Y REV. 117, 144 (2016) [hereinafter Detained
Study].
10
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., FY 2016 STATISTICS YEARBOOK A2–A3 (2017)
[hereinafter EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK], https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/fysb16/download; Office of the
Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chief-immigrationjudge (last visited Aug. 20, 2018).
11
Not all aliens subject to removal are entitled to a formal removal proceeding before an immigration
judge. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that certain arriving aliens and recent entrants without
documentation or with fraudulent documents, and certain noncitizens posing national security risks, may be
subject to “expedited removal,” in which a summary and final order of removal is entered not by an immigration
judge but rather by an enforcement officer within the Department of Homeland Security. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (c)(1) (2012); see Ebba Gebisa, Constitutional Concerns with the Enforcement and
Expansion of Expedited Removal, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 565, 567, 576 (2007). Formal removal proceedings
may also be denied to noncitizens without legal permanent resident status who have been convicted of an
“aggravated felony.” 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b) (2012) (providing that the Attorney General may develop truncated
removal procedures for such noncitizens); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012) (defining “aggravated
felony”); NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWS. GUILD, PRACTICE ADVISORY: ADMINISTRATIVE
REMOVAL UNDER 238(b) 1 (Feb. 16, 2017), https://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/practiceadvisory-administrative-removal-under-238b.pdf (describing administrative removal procedures for such
noncitizens).
12
The federal courts of appeals have been particularly critical. See, e.g., Huang v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d
142, 148 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The hearings included several instances of questioning by the [immigration judge]
that were at least inappropriate and at worst indicative of bias against Chinese witnesses.”); Cham v. Att’y Gen.
of the U.S., 445 F.3d 683, 686 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The case now before us exemplifies the ‘severe wound . . .
inflicted’ when not a modicum of courtesy, of respect, or of any pretense of fairness is extended to a petitioner
and the case he so valiantly attempted to present. Yet once again, under the ‘bullying’ nature of the immigration
judge’s questioning, a petitioner was ground to bits.”); Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir.
2005) (Posner, J.) (concluding that immigration court adjudication “has fallen below the minimum standards of
legal justice”); Wang v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The tone, the tenor, the
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outcomes,13 staggering processing times and backlogs,14 and an overall lack of
fair and meaningful deliberation.15 Unlike prior reform proposals,16 however,
the Trump Administration has sought to expand its political control over these
courts.17 Over the past year and a half, under the tenure of Attorney General Jeff

disparagement, and the sarcasm of the [immigration judge] seem more appropriate to a court television show
than a federal court proceeding.”); Recinos De Leon v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1185, 1193 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The
[immigration judge] opinion in this case is extreme in its lack of a coherent explanation.”). See generally Jonah
B. Gelbach & David Marcus, Rethinking Judicial Review of High Volume Agency Adjudication, 97 TEX. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 15, 24), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1951/
(documenting circuit court criticism of immigration courts); Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration
Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1645–46, 1648–49 (2010) (documenting widespread criticism of immigration
courts).
13
Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 16, 30, 47, 53–54 (2015) (noting disparities based on whether noncitizen was represented by
counsel); Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in
Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 372 (2007) (documenting disparities in rates of granting asylum
applications); Ryo, Detained Study, supra note 9 (documenting disparities in rates of granting bond and amounts
of bond).
14
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-438, IMMIGRATION COURTS: ACTIONS NEEDED TO
REDUCE CASE BACKLOG AND ADDRESS LONG-STANDING MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES 25
(2017) [hereinafter GAO 2017 REPORT]; Lenni B. Benson & Russell R. Wheeler, Report for the Administrative
Conference of the United States: Enhancing Quality and Timeliness in Immigration Removal Adjudication 24–
25, 27–29 (2012), https://www.acus.gov/report/immigration-removal-adjudication-report; BOOZ ALLEN
HAMILTON, LEGAL CASE STUDY: SUMMARY REPORT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW 3, 19, 21, 25 (2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/
foia_documents/immigration_judge_performance_metrics_foia_request_booz_allen_hamilton_case_study.pdf.
15
See, e.g., Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 595, 611, 624, 627, 632 (2009) (criticizing practices diverting noncitizens from formal removal
proceedings); Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving Due Process (Goodbye): Stipulated Orders of Removal and the Crisis
in Immigration Adjudication, 91 N.C. L. REV. 475, 504 (2013) (criticizing practice of obtaining waivers of right
to removal proceedings); John R.B. Palmer et al., Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration
Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 29–32, 76 (2005) (criticizing reforms to streamline decision-making of immigration courts
at the administrative appeals level).
16
For proposals to reform immigration adjudication, see Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration
Adjudication, supra note 12, at 1686 (proposing creation of new Article III immigration appellate court); RamjiNogales et al., supra note 13, at 380–87 (recommending various reforms to immigration courts and Board of
Immigration Appeals); ABA, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 6-4 (proposing systemic
restructuring of immigration adjudication); BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 18–26 (setting forth
various recommendations including expanded hiring and training of immigration judges).
17
Attempts to politicize immigration court proceedings are not unprecedented. See U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY AND OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AN INVESTIGATION OF
ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL 137 (2008) [hereinafter DOJ INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT], https://oig.justice.gov/special/
s0807/final.pdf (finding that hiring within EOIR was made on the basis of political affiliation in violation of law
and Department policy); Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 369, 372–74 (2006) [hereinafter Legomsky, War on Independence] (describing evisceration of decisional
independence of immigration judges); Bijal Shah, The Attorney General’s Disruptive Immigration Power, 102
IOWA L. REV. BULL. 129, 143–44 (2016–2017); cf. Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive
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Sessions, the Trump Administration has eliminated immigration judges’
authority to grant relief from removal in the form of administrative closure;
altered longstanding agency precedent regarding the availability of asylum;
sought to mandate the detention of virtually all noncitizens pending removal
proceedings; engaged in an aggressive hiring plan to recruit new judges; and
implemented supervisory mechanisms including performance metrics to
expedite case processing and increase rates of removal.18 These reforms cast
doubt on the conventional narrative within administrative law scholarship
maintaining that while the White House has expanded control over various
aspects of the regulatory state, it refrains from interfering in administrative
adjudications.19
Whatever one’s substantive policy preferences—whether one believes that
we should be deporting more or fewer noncitizens from our country—these
developments raise fundamental concerns regarding the legitimacy of
presidential control over administrative adjudications more generally.20 The
increased politicization of agency adjudications raises a host of thorny questions
about the extent to which such proceedings should be insulated from political
Branch Immigration Policy Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841, 896–97
(2016) (endorsing such political control).
18
See infra Section II.C.
19
See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2306 (2001) (observing
expansion of presidential control over agency decision-making but maintaining that such control does not reach
administrative adjudications); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
1163, 1211 (2013) [hereinafter Vermeule, Agency Independence] (asserting existence of a “network of tacit
unwritten conventions” functioning to “protect the independence of” federal agencies engaged in adjudication).
But see Harold J. Krent, Presidential Control of Adjudication Within the Executive Branch, 65 CASE WEST. L.
REV. 1083, 1091–1105 (2015) (describing mechanisms through which the President may influence agency
adjudications).
20
Evidence of a growing politicization of agency adjudications is not limited to the immigration context.
The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) recently published a report surveying adjudicators’
susceptibility to political influence across the administrative state. See KENT BARNETT ET AL., NON-ALJ
ADJUDICATORS IN FEDERAL AGENCIES: STATUS, SELECTION, OVERSIGHT, AND REMOVAL (2018) [hereinafter
NON-ALJ ADJUDICATORS] (surveying lack of protections from political influence in agency adjudicators across
the administrative state), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Non-ALJ%20Draft%20Report_2.
pdf. Scholars have also documented bias and political interference in adjudications within particular agencies.
See Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797, 818 (2013) (noting administrative efforts
to interfere in Social Security Administration adjudications); Christina L. Boyd & Amanda Driscoll,
Adjudicatory Oversight and Judicial Decision Making in Executive Branch Agencies, 41 AM. POLS. RES. 569,
570–71 (2013) (assessing political control over adjudications within the Department of Agriculture); Krent,
supra note 19, at 1110–14 (examining political oversight in SSA adjudications); Robert R. Kuehn, Addressing
Bias in Administrative Environmental Decisions, 37 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 693, 699–700, 774,
781–82 (2017) (examining claims of political bias in EPA adjudications); Amy Elizabeth Semet, An Empirical
Examination of Adjudications at the National Labor Relations Board 184 (2015) (unpublished dissertation) (on
file with Columbia University) (describing political interference in NLRB adjudications), https://
academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:189982.
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influence. Commentators often assert that presidential control over agency
adjudications would be normatively, if not constitutionally, problematic.21 This
Article asserts that the normative calculus is somewhat more complicated,
implicating a constellation of often-competing goals including individual
fairness, democratic accountability, accuracy, efficiency, and fidelity to
separation-of-powers principles.22 It proceeds as follows. Part I briefly recounts
the rise of presidential control over agency decision-making and the
conventional assumption that such control does not extend to agency
adjudications. Part II documents evidence to rebut that assumption, identifying
a series of recent reforms designed to shift outcomes in immigration
adjudication. Part III identifies the legal norms at stake in the politicization of
agency adjudications and evaluates the recent reforms to removal proceedings
on the basis of these metrics.
I.

THE CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNT OF PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL

Federal agencies occupy a special place in our constitutional system.23
Formally, they are constituent parts of the Executive Branch serving under the

21
See Barnett, supra note 20, at 816 (noting that limited independence of ALJs “raises impartiality, and
thus due process, concerns”); Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better
Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1263, 1300 (1962) [hereinafter Friendly, The Federal Administrative
Agencies] (“Everyone, including the presidential activists, seems to agree that ‘the outcome of any particular
adjudicatory matter is . . . as much beyond . . . [the President’s] concern . . . as the outcome of any cause pending
in the courts . . . .’”) (quoting JAMES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
33 (1960) (alterations in original)); Kagan, supra note 19, at 2363 (noting that presidential control over agency
adjudications “would contravene procedural norms and inject an inappropriate influence into the resolution of
controversies”); Krent, supra note 19, at 1084 (acknowledging President’s inherent authority to manage agency
adjudications but asserting that “political control over adjudication seems anathema to rights of litigants asserting
claims against the government itself”); see also Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV.
1741, 1744 (2009) (noting that presidential control over agency actions may compromise democratic
accountability); Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1,
71–72 (2017) [hereinafter Metzger, The Administrative State Under Siege] (arguing that checks on presidential
control over agencies are constitutionally required). But see Gonzales & Glen, supra note 17, at 896–97
(extolling political control over immigration adjudication); James E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary’s
Independence Myth, 41 WAKE F. L. REV. 1191, 1200, 1234 (2006) (maintaining that administrative judges
should be impartial, but not politically independent).
22
See Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The Déjà vu of Decisional
Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475, 481 (2007) (“There is an obvious tension between
the oversight that promotes consistency and accuracy and the decisional independence of agency adjudicators.
This tension has bedeviled administrative law from its inception.”); Legomsky, War on Independence, supra
note 17, at 390 (noting tension between decisional independence and political accountability); Adrian Vermeule,
Bureaucracy and Distrust: Landis, Jaffe, and Kagan on the Administrative State, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2487
(2017) (endorsing “marginalist” approach to optimize a plurality of competing values).
23
See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 579 (1984).
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President.24 But Congress is responsible for creating agencies and delegating
their authority,25 and the federal courts play a crucial role in policing
administrative exercises of that authority.26
Through time, theorists have developed a series of models to describe how
agencies are controlled. Prior models conceptualized agencies as primarily
agents of Congress, while others emphasized the extent to which they are subject
to control by federal courts or even non-governmental interest groups.27 Under
the currently prevailing model, the “presidential control model,” the White
House and its political appointees are understood to be the primary drivers of
agency action.28 This Part proceeds in three sections: Section A offers a brief
description of the presidential control model of agency action. Section B
explains the conventional assumption that such control stops short of agency
adjudications. Finally, section C points out weaknesses in assuming adjudicative
independence from political influence.

24
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926) (“The vesting of the
[E]xecutive power in the President was essentially a grant of the power to execute the laws. But the President
alone and unaided could not execute the laws. He must execute them by the assistance of subordinates . . . . As
he is charged specifically to take care that [the laws] be faithfully executed, the reasonable implication, even in
the absence of express words, was that as part of his [E]xecutive power he should select those who were to act
for him under his direction . . . .”).
25
See, e.g., La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency literally has no
power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”).
26
LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320 (1965) (“The availability of
judicial review is the necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative power
which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid.”).
27
Under the “transmission belt” model, agencies were understood to be controlled primarily by Congress,
which issued discrete statutory directives with little policymaking discretion. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond
Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 470 (2003).
By contrast, under the “interest group representation” model, agencies were viewed as controlled by a political
process in which competing interest groups negotiate and compromise on policy outcomes. See id. at 475, 469–
77 (describing other historical models of agency control).
28
See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical
Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 52–53 (2006) (examining presidential control
from perspective of agency officials); Kagan, supra note 19, at 2331 (endorsing presidential control over agency
policymaking); Metzger, The Administrative State Under Siege, supra note 21, at 14–15 (describing emergence
of presidential administrative control); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Presidential Control is Better than the Alternatives,
88 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 113, 114, 116 (2009–2011) (recognizing dominance of presidential control model);
Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “the Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
696, 702–03 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss, The President in Administrative Law] (arguing that President has power
to oversee, but not direct, agency action); Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 683, 688 (2016) (noting that presidential control has become “an entrenched feature of the regulatory state”
and proposing doctrinal rules to “control . . . but not unnecessarily constrain” such influence).
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A. Emergence of Presidential Control
For the past quarter-century, administrative law scholars have observed the
steady expansion of White House influence over agency action; indeed,
presidential control has become the defining feature of our modern regulatory
landscape.29 Two mechanisms have been crucial in allowing the White House
and its political leadership to ensure that agency decisions adhere to and promote
the President’s political agenda: (1) the emergence of centralized White House
regulatory planning and review; and (2) the expansion of presidential
appointments in agencies.
Centralized regulatory planning and review. For decades, the Oval Office
has ensured that regulatory decisions are vetted through the White House.
Building on earlier administrations’ efforts to enhance interagency coordination,
President Ronald Reagan required all Executive Branch agencies to submit
“major” rulemaking proposals for pre-approval to the White House Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).30 President Bill Clinton expanded
that centralization, requiring both Executive Branch agencies and independent
ones to submit a list of “significant regulatory actions” planned for the
forthcoming year.31 President George W. Bush extended these requirements to
cover not only proposed rules and regulations but also guidance documents
exempt from notice-and-comment requirements,32 a mandate which President
Obama retained.33
Expansion of presidential appointees. The number and percentage of
presidentially appointed agency positions has nearly doubled over the past fifty
years, and the vast majority of these positions serve at the pleasure of the
President with no protections from removal.34 Moreover, Congress has
eliminated civil service protections for large segments of the bureaucracy,
rendering a growing number of agency officials vulnerable to removal on

29

Supra note 28 and accompanying text.
Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981–1982). While OIRA does not claim the power to
reject regulatory proposals outright, it routinely returns proposals to agencies for reconsideration and can delay
release indefinitely. See Kagan, supra note 19, at 2278.
31
Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 4(c)(B), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993–1994).
32
Exec. Order No. 13,422, §§ 3(g)–(h), 4(b)–(c), 3 C.F.R. § 191 (2007–2008).
33
Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts &
Agencies (Mar. 4, 2009).
34
DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL AND
BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 21–22 (2008); see also DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, ADMIN.
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 70, 82–83 (2013), https://
www.acus.gov/publication/sourcebook-united-states-executive-agencies.
30
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ideological grounds rather than for cause.35 As then-Professor David Barron
observed, “agencies are now staffed in ways that make them increasingly likely
to speak the White House line as if it were their own, even if they have not been
ordered to do so by the President.”36 Taken together, these mechanisms enable
significant political oversight over agency decision-making.
Agency decision-making, however, takes many forms, including not only
purely “Executive” functions but also quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudicative
ones.37 Purely “Executive” decisions include ministerial exercises of specified
statutory directives as well as decisions to enforce individual violations of
generally applicable standards.38 “Legislative” or quasi-legislative decisions
involve the promulgation of those generally applicable standards of conduct; in
the agency context, they are most closely associated with exercises of
rulemaking authority.39 “Adjudicative” or quasi-adjudicative decisions involve
the resolution of disputes between discrete parties, typically in an adversarial,
trial-like setting.40
Presidents have long exercised control over administrative exercises of
purely Executive functions.41 As Professor Peter Strauss recounts, President
Jackson, who staunchly opposed the creation of the Bank of the United States,
directed two successive Treasury Secretaries to remove all funds from the Bank
and terminated them for refusing to heed his command.42 President Nixon
purportedly fired Leon Panetta (who would later serve as the Director of the CIA
and Secretary of Defense) from his leadership post at the Office for Civil Rights
35
LEWIS & SELIN, supra note 34, at 72–81 (describing expansion of federal employees exempted from
civil service protections).
36
David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency
Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1121 (2008).
37
See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1248 (1994)
(characterizing concentration of these functions as “perhaps the crowning jewel of the modern administrative
revolution”); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1394 (2004)
(noting breadth of policymaking tools available to agencies); see also PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW UNLAWFUL? 2–4, 493–94 (2014) (criticizing agency assumption of power to engage in quasi-legislative
and quasi-adjudicative acts).
38
See Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1034 (2013)
(“Enforcement is at the core of the President’s constitutional duty to ‘take Care’ that laws are faithfully
executed.” (footnote omitted)); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 596 (1994) (characterizing decision to fine a bank for violation of banking
laws as exercise of purely Executive power); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67
VAND. L. REV. 671, 696–97 (2014) (characterizing enforcement discretion as part of President’s duty to
“faithfully” execute the laws).
39
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4)–(5), 553 (2012).
40
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(6)–(7), 554, 556, 557 (2012).
41
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
42
See Strauss, The President in Administrative Law, supra note 28, at 706.
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in the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare because the
latter refused to comply with presidential policies designed to court southern
white voters.43 President Obama directed his administration to enforce sex
discrimination laws to protect LGBTQ individuals.44 More controversially, he
ordered the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to refrain from enforcing
immigration laws against undocumented noncitizens who were brought to the
United States as children.45
Past Presidents have exercised meaningful control over agencies engaged in
quasi-legislative functions as well. The Carter White House exercised power in
a range of rulemaking contexts, including occupational safety, air pollution, and
strip mining.46 President Clinton directed the promulgation of regulations
relating to youth smoking and parental leave policies.47 Such presidential control
over rulemaking is not always apparent,48 but it undoubtedly exists. According
to one empirical study, the Clinton White House allowed fewer than 40% of
proposed regulations to proceed without change; during the Bush
Administration, only 17% of such proposals proceeded unaltered.49 These
examples demonstrate the extent to which Presidents have asserted control over
agency decisions relating to Executive functions as well as Legislative ones.
B. Presumed Restraint Toward Adjudicative Functions
It has generally been understood, however, that presidential control stops
short of one form of agency decision-making: that of administrative

43
LEON E. PANETTA & PETER GALL, BRING US TOGETHER: THE NIXON TEAM AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
RETREAT 1, 350 (1971); see also Catherine Y. Kim, Presidential Control Across Policymaking Tools, 43 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 91, 111 (2015) (documenting political control over enforcement of anti-discrimination
protections).
44
President Barack H. Obama, Remarks by the President at Signing of Executive Order on LGBT
Workplace Discrimination (July 21, 2014).
45
President Barack H. Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012); Robert J.
Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the
DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 792, 794 (2013) (challenging constitutionality of
the Obama Administration’s immigration enforcement policy).
46
Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 943, 944–46 (1980).
47
Kagan, supra note 19, at 2282–84; see also Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI. KENT
L. REV. 965, 965 (1997).
48
See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 28; Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight
of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1146–47 (2010). For a discussion of the Bush
Administration’s covert efforts to control EPA rulemaking, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and
Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 799–801 (2007); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts
v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 55 (2007); Kitrosser, supra note 21, at 1767.
49
Mendelson, supra note 48, at 1150.
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adjudication. In 1962, Judge Henry Friendly observed, “[e]veryone, including
the presidential activists, seems to agree that ‘the outcome of any particular
adjudicatory matter is . . . as much beyond . . . [the President’s] concern . . . as
the outcome of any cause pending in the courts . . . .”50 Then-Professor Elena
Kagan’s account of President Clinton’s expansive control over agencies
similarly notes, “[t]he only mode of administrative action from which Clinton
shrank was adjudication. At no time in his tenure did he attempt publicly to
exercise the powers that a department head possesses over an agency’s on-therecord determinations.”51 Professor Adrian Vermeule likewise asserts the
existence of a “network of tacit unwritten conventions” protecting agency
adjudications from presidential interference.52
The contention that agency adjudications remain impervious to political
interference rests on two more specific assumptions. First, that the White House
is legally constrained in the extent to which it can control agency adjudications.
And second, that public sensibilities, or “conventions,” would not tolerate
exercises of raw political power in the adjudicative context.
1. Legal Constraints
The claim that the President, whether through the White House or his
political appointees, refrains from interfering in administrative adjudications
rests in part on the assumption that agency adjudicators are protected from such
influence by legal barriers.53 Congress has legislated a series of measures to
protect the independence of agency adjudicators. Most formal adjudications
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which governs all agency
actions unless a more specific statute controls, are decided in the first instance
by Administrative Law Judges (ALJs),54 who are not recruited by the agency’s
political leadership and cannot be fired except for good cause.55
50

Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies, supra note 21.
See Kagan, supra note 19.
52
See Vermeule, Agency Independence, supra note 19.
53
For a discussion of the constitutional and statutory contours of the President’s power to control agency
adjudications, see Krent, supra note 19 (arguing that Congress should be able to delimit presidential authority
over agency adjudicators); see also Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 246, 255 (1987) (analyzing role of
agency institutional design in defining extent to which agency decisions are influenced by political actors).
54
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3105, 5372(a) (2012); see also MICHAEL ASIMOW, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS OUTSIDE
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 2 (2016) (noting that “[w]ith few exceptions,” formal adjudicative
hearings under the APA are presided over by an ALJ).
55
For a discussion of the parameters for hiring and firing ALJs, see Barnett, supra note 20, at 799, 806–
07; James G. Gilbert & Robert S. Cohen, Administrative Adjudication in the United States, 37 J. NAT’L ASS’N
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY, 222, 225–26 (2017). The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence signals renewed attention
51
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The APA further protects the process of administrative adjudication from
political influence. Section 556(e) explicitly limits the information on which the
agency adjudicator may rely in reaching a decision: “The transcript of testimony
and exhibits, together with all papers and requests filed in the proceeding,
constitutes the exclusive record for decision . . . .”56 It further requires disclosure
of any material outside of the record that is considered in reaching the decision.57
Even agency adjudications that are not subject to the APA typically enjoy a
degree of statutory protection from political interference.58 Removal
proceedings in immigration courts, for example, are not governed by the APA,59
but rather by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).60 Like the APA,
however, the INA provides private parties with a relatively formal evidentiary
proceeding and a complete record of all the testimony and evidence produced at
that proceeding.61 It also mandates that a decision to deport “shall be based only
on the evidence produced at the hearing,”62 providing assurance that removal
decisions be based on the agency adjudicator’s independent assessment of the
record rather than at the direction of political leadership.63
2. Cultural Constraints
Professor Adrian Vermeule posits an alternative reason for the assumption
that “presidential direction of the adjudicative activities of executive agencies”
has been limited.64 The reason for this phenomenon, he claims, is the power of
to the constitutional status of ALJs. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
542–43 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting majority opinion casts doubt on constitutionality of for-cause
removal protections for ALJs); Lucia v. SEC, No. 17–130, slip op. at 5, 10 (U.S. June 21, 2018) (holding that
ALJs within the independent SEC are “Officers of the United States” and must be appointed consistent with
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
56
5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (2012).
57
Id. (“When an agency decision rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence
in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to an opportunity to show the contrary.”).
58
The vast majority of formal agency adjudications, i.e., those requiring an evidentiary hearing, occur
outside the parameters of the APA. Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency
Adjudication, 107 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 2, 7), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3129560; see also ASIMOW, supra note 56 (noting diversity of formal agency adjudications
exempted from APA requirements).
59
Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955) (noting legislative enactment clarifying congressional
intent to exempt removal proceedings from APA requirements).
60
8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2012).
61
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(2)(A), (b)(4)(A)–(C).
62
8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(1)(A).
63
Implementing regulations further provide, “[i]n deciding individual cases before them, and subject to
the applicable governing standards, immigration judges shall exercise their independent judgment and
discretion.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(d)(ii) (2018).
64
Vermeule, Agency Independence, supra note 19.
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“conventions.”65 He asserts, “[t]he real source of the limitation is a network of
tacit unwritten conventions that protect independence of even executive
agencies when engaged in adjudication.”66 He explains: “[a]mong the
communities that shape administrative law—including civil servants, the
organized bar, legislative committees, and regulated parties—presidential
direction of administrative adjudication would be seen as an unprecedented
exertion of power, violating longstanding unwritten traditions, and would for
that reason provoke a storm of protest.”67
From this perspective, the White House and its political appointees refrain
from interfering in agency adjudications not because of formal legal constraints,
but rather because of informal cultural ones. We live in a political culture which
disdains the exercise of overt political influence in individual cases.
3. Historical Attempts to Politicize Agency Adjudications
Historical attempts to politicize agency adjudications suggest that legal and
cultural constraints, at least in the past, have succeeded in protecting these types
of administrative proceedings from significant political influence. In 1980, in
response to political concerns that agency adjudicators within the Social
Security Administration were too generous in awarding disabilities benefits,
Congress enacted a new provision requiring review over decisions of ALJs who
granted more than 70% of claims.68 The Association of Administrative Law
Judges filed suit, and a district court concluded that the provision violated the
spirit, if not the letter, of the APA.69
A second example involved immigration court adjudications during the
Bush Administration. From 2004 to 2007, the White House directed the hiring
of new immigration judges (IJs) and members of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA), screening candidates for partisan affiliation.70 In 2008, however,
the Department of Justice Offices of the Inspector General and of Professional

65

Id. at 1181, 1194.
Id. at 1211.
67
Id. at 1213.
68
Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1134–35 (D.D.C. 1984); JERRY L.
MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 171, 174–76 (1983);
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Federal Administrative Judiciary: Establishing an Appropriate System of Performance
Evaluation for ALJs, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 589, 595–97 (1993–1994).
69
594 F. Supp. at 1136–37, 1142–43.
70
DOJ INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT, supra note 17, at 1, 135.
66
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Responsibility issued a joint report finding that these hiring practices violated
Department policy as well as federal law.71
The public outcry over these incidents,72 as well as the findings of illegality,
suggest that both legal barriers and conventions about adjudicative
independence imposed meaningful constraints on political interference in
agency adjudications.
C. Reevaluating the Presumption of Adjudicative Independence from
Presidential Control
Yet, the political insulation of agency adjudications cannot be taken for
granted. After all, the White House retains powerful reasons for wanting to
control them. Federal agencies adjudicate everything from disability claims to
unfair labor practices, from the granting of broadcast licenses to approval for
corporate mergers.73 As such, these decisions have a substantial impact on the
President’s ability to achieve his policy goals.74 In Securities Exchange
Commission v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), the Supreme Court endorsed the use
of agency adjudication as a means for announcing broadly applicable policy
changes. In that case, the Commission announced a new standard of conduct—
precluding fiduciaries from trading in a company’s shares pending
reorganization—in the course of an individual adjudication.75 Rejecting the
managers’ and officers’ claim that the new standard could only be established
through rulemaking procedures, the Court held, “the choice made between
proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies
primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”76
Consequently, agency adjudications—no less than enforcement decisions or
rulemaking—can play a powerful role in promoting or frustrating the President’s
policy agenda. As Professor William Araiza notes, “courts normally purport
71

Id.
See generally Eric Lichtblau, Report Faults Aides in Hiring at Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES (July 29,
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/29/washington/29justice.html.
73
See Gilbert & Cohen, supra note 55, at 254 (surveying breadth of agency adjudications). See generally
ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S. AND STANFORD LAW SCH., REPRESENTATION OF PRIVATE PARTIES, https://acus.law.
stanford.edu/content/federal-administrative-adjudication (mapping contours of federal agency adjudication).
74
Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA. L. REV. 693, 718 (2005)
(exploring development of policy through agency adjudications).
75
SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 197–99 (1947).
76
Id. at 203 (italics removed); see also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (affirming
that the agency “is not precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding, and that the
choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within” the agency’s discretion); see also
Magill, supra note 37 (addressing absence of direct judicial constraints on agency choice to implement new
policies through one particular policymaking tool rather than another).
72
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only to apply existing law, while federal agencies are explicitly understood to
have the power to make law in the course of deciding cases.”77 These factors
provide the White House with strong incentives to influence the course of
agency adjudications.78
Even agency adjudications that do not announce binding national policy,
such as those made at the trial level in disabilities adjudications or removal
proceedings, impact the lives of millions of Americans and thus, potentially, a
President’s political fortunes. For example, it is often observed that the annual
number of adjudications within the Social Security Administration far exceeds
that of all federal courts put together.79 There are over half a million deportation
cases currently pending in immigration courts,80 decisions that will inevitably
impact not only the noncitizen at issue, but also his or her family members,
employers, and others. At the same time, the legal and cultural barriers to
presidential control over agency adjudications are far from impenetrable.
1. Limits of Legal Barriers to Political Control
While Congress has imposed legal restrictions on the extent to which politics
may influence agency adjudications, those restrictions are incomplete. Although
most formal adjudications under the APA are heard in the first instance by an
impartial adjudicator separated from prosecutorial or investigate functions,81 the
statute expressly allows that the initial hearing may be conducted instead by the
politically appointed leadership of an agency.82 And, even when a politically
insulated civil servant presides over the hearing in the first instance, the APA
grants agency leadership virtually unfettered discretion to reverse that initial
decision.83
77
William D. Araiza, Agency Adjudication, the Importance of Facts, and the Limitations of Labels, 57
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351, 353 (2000).
78
Professor Peter Strauss suggests that career officials within the administrative bureaucracy employ
adjudication to promulgate policies in part to avoid obstacles posed by their politically appointed superiors. Peter
L. Strauss, Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law in an Executive Department: Reflections on the
Interior Department’s Administration of the Mining Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1231, 1253 (1974).
79
See, e.g., PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN & BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES AND
COMMENTS 26 (12th ed. 2018).
80
Overview of the Executive Office for Immigration Review: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration & Border Sec. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 2 (2017) (statement of James McHenry, Acting
Dir., Exec. Office for Immigration Review) [hereinafter McHenry Testimony], https://judiciary.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/Witness-Testimony-James-McHenry-EIOR-11-01-2017.pdf.
81
5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 556(b), 557(b) (2012).
82
5 U.S.C. § 556(b). The Supreme Court has sustained such decision-making against due process
challenges. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702–03 (1948).
83
5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (“On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers
which it would have in making the initial decision . . . .”).

KIM_GALLEYPROOFS

2018]

9/26/2018 9:59 AM

THE PRESIDENT’S IMMIGRATION COURTS

17

Moreover, the majority of formal agency adjudications (i.e., those involving
an evidentiary hearing) are not governed by the APA.84 For immigration removal
proceedings, the INA vests adjudicative power in immigration judges (IJs)
personally, precluding the agency’s politically appointed leadership from
presiding over these hearings.85 Nonetheless, it defines an IJ as an attorney
appointed by the Attorney General who remains “subject to such supervision
and shall perform such duties as the Attorney General shall prescribe.”86
Moreover, although the Department of Justice Inspector General has concluded
that civil service laws protect IJs from politically- or ideologically-motivated
employment decisions,87 the Attorney General in 2002 issued regulations
asserting that such officials are subject to removal or reassignment effectively at
the Attorney General’s discretion.88
Indeed, although the INA, unlike the APA, provides that federal courts
possess exclusive authority to review the decisions of IJs,89 the Attorney General
has, through regulation, created an interim review body—the Board of
Immigration Appeals90—and a “refer-and-review” procedure by which the
Attorney General can unilaterally reverse any decision of the BIA.91 The
Attorney General has exercised this refer-and-review power repeatedly to
reverse BIA decisions perceived to depart from the President’s political
agenda.92 Indeed, former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales recently coauthored a law review article championing the exercise of this authority,
characterizing it “as a powerful tool through which the Executive Branch can
assert its prerogatives in the immigration field.”93

84

See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012) (“An immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for
deciding the admissibility or deportability of an alien.”), with 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2012) (providing that the
agency itself may preside over the taking of evidence in an adjudicative hearing).
86
8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2012).
87
See DOJ INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT, supra note 17; 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301(a)(1), (b)(8)(A)–(B), 2302(B)–(C)
(2012); 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(c)–(d) (2018).
88
Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg.
54,878, 54,893 (Aug. 26, 2002).
89
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2012).
90
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2018).
91
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1). For a discussion on this refer-and-review authority, see Gonzales & Glen,
supra note 17, at 850; Shah, The Attorney General’s Disruptive Immigration Power, supra note 17, at 130.
92
See Margaret H. Taylor, Midnight Agency Administration: Attorney General Review of Board of
Immigration Appeals Decisions, 102 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 18, 21, 23 (2016–2017) (describing political exercises
of refer-and-review power).
93
Gonzales & Glen, supra note 17, at 841.
85
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2. Limits of Conventions as a Barrier to Political Control
The permeability of legal barriers to political influence suggests that the only
real protection against presidential interference in agency adjudications may rest
on soft “conventions.”94 But it is not at all clear that these soft norms will be
sufficient to counterbalance the President’s incentives to control agency
adjudications. The recent article co-authored by former Attorney General
Gonzales demonstrates that the convention of independence does not prevent
agency leadership from celebrating, much less exercising, its power to reverse
the decisions of lower-level adjudicators.95 Political scientists have documented
a similar willingness to exercise such review authority in other agencies.96
Perhaps more disturbing, political actors may circumvent formal review
altogether by pressuring agency adjudicators directly,97 thereby obscuring the
exercise of political influence.
Finally, even if conventions were effective in restraining prior
administrations, the current President is perhaps singular in his willingness to
defy such soft norms. If conventional norms were the primary reason why prior
Presidents refrained from exercising control over agency adjudications, we
should not be surprised if such restraint dissipates in the current Administration.
II. EMERGENCE OF PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OVER AGENCY ADJUDICATION
The current Administration casts doubt on the conventional wisdom that
agency adjudications remain impervious to presidential control. Over the past
year and a half, the Trump Administration has implemented a series of reforms
promising to fundamentally reshape the adjudication of removal claims in
immigration courts. This Part begins with section A, analyzing the central role
that immigration played in the election of President Trump, and the political
capital he has since invested in achieving his immigration objectives. It then
describes, in section B, the structure of immigration adjudication in the
Executive Branch, outlining the role of immigration courts in developing
94
Vermeule, Agency Independence, supra note 19 (arguing that conventions, not legal barriers, present
the only meaningful protection against politicized agency adjudications)
95
Gonzales & Glen, supra note 17, at 859, 899.
96
See Boyd & Driscoll, supra note 20 (examining exercise of reversal power by politically appointed
Secretary of Agriculture over ALJ decisions); Krent, supra note 19, at 1084–86; Martin H. Redish & Lawrence
C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Value of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 477, 499
(1986).
97
Barnett, supra note 20, at 818–19 (noting that 26% of ALJs within the Social Security Administration
and 9% of non-Social Security Administration administrative judges report feeling pressure from agency
leadership to rule differently).
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national policy. Finally, it identifies in section C a series of emerging tools the
Trump Administration has employed to exercise political control over these
courts to ensure their decisions conform to the President’s policy agenda.
A. The President’s Immigration Agenda
President Trump has placed immigration reform at the center of his policy
agenda. On the campaign trail, he pledged to rid the country of “illegal
immigrants.”98 Seeking the Republican primary nomination, he promised to
effectuate “mass deportations,”99 describing at one point a plan to deport all
undocumented aliens in the United States within two years.100 Even after
securing the party nomination, Trump returned to these themes again and again.
At an August 2016 campaign rally in Austin, he attacked his Democratic
opponent for allegedly endorsing a “catch-and-release” policy to allow aliens to
remain free while removal proceedings are pending, “massive amnesty in her
first 100 days,” and “let[ting] people overstay their visas without removal.”101
He warned: “We must not let it happen . . . . This election will decide whether
or not we have a border. This election will decide whether or not we have a
country.”102 The same month, in a speech in Phoenix, he promised: “In a Trump
Administration all immigration laws will be enforced . . . . [N]o one will be
immune or exempt from enforcement . . . . Anyone who has entered the United
States illegally is subject to deportation. That is what it means to have laws and
to have a country.”103
Since assuming office, the President has continued to invest significant
political capital in the achievement of his immigration goals, reiterating his
commitment to deporting noncitizens repeatedly through Executive orders,
speeches, and press releases. Within a week of his inauguration, he issued
Executive Order 13,768, which states: “We cannot faithfully execute the
immigration laws of the United States if we exempt classes or categories of
98
See Nick Gass, Trump’s Immigration Plan: Mass Deportation, POLITICO (Aug. 17, 2015, 6:25 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2015/08/donald-trump-immigration-plan-121420;
Donald
J.
Trump,
Immigration Reform That Will Make America Great Again, https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/ImmigrationReform-Trump.pdf.
99
Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Messy Legal Process Could Challenge Trump’s Mass Deportation Plan, FOX
NEWS (Nov. 27, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/11/27/messy-legal-process-could-challengetrumps-mass-deportation-plan.html.
100
Julia Preston et al., What Would It Take for Donald Trump to Deport 11 Million and Build a Wall?
N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/20/us/politics/donald-trump-immigration.html.
101
Donald J. Trump, Remarks at Luedecke Arena in Austin, Texas (Aug. 23, 2016).
102
Id.
103
Donald J. Trump, Remarks on Immigration at the Phoenix Convention Center in Phoenix, Arizona
(Aug. 31, 2016).
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removable aliens from potential enforcement.”104 The Order continues: “It is the
policy of the [E]xecutive [B]ranch to . . . [e]nsure the faithful execution of
immigration laws . . . against all removable aliens.”105
His cabinet appointees have been equally clear in the Administration’s
policy commitments, particularly Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who played a
central role in the development of Trump’s immigration policy agenda during
the campaign.106 In remarks at the Mexican border in April 2017, Sessions
stated, “[u]nder the President’s leadership and through his Executive Orders, we
will secure this border and bring the full weight of both the immigration courts
and federal criminal enforcement to combat this attack on our national security
and sovereignty.”107 He continued: “For those that continue to seek improper
and illegal entry into this country, be forewarned: This is a new era. This is the
Trump era. The lawlessness, the abdication of the duty to enforce our
immigration laws and the catch and release practices of old are over.”108 In these
ways, the President and his political appointees have staked much of the
Administration’s political future on its success in removing noncitizens from the
United States.
B. Immigration Courts
Immigration courts play a key role in the Trump Administration’s ability to
achieve its immigration goals. There are an estimated eleven million aliens
currently residing in the United States without authorization, either because they
entered without inspection or remained after their visas expired.109 Moreover, an
estimated 1.9 million aliens (the Administration suggests two or three million)—
most of whom are present lawfully and many of whom are longtime legal
permanent residents—are subject to deportation based on non-immigration
related conduct such as the commission of crimes.110 For the vast majority of

104

Exec. Order 13,768, § 1 (2017).
Id. § 2(a) (emphasis added).
106
Amber Phillips, 10 Things to Know About Sen. Jeff Sessions, Donald Trump’s Pick for Attorney
General, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/18/10things-to-know-about-sen-jeff-sessions-donald-trumps-pick-for-attorney-general/ (explaining the role that
Sessions played in creating the Trump campaign’s immigration policy positions).
107
Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks Announcing the Department of Justice’s Renewed
Commitment to Criminal Immigration Enforcement (Apr. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Sessions Remarks at Nogales]..
108
Id.
109
Passel & Cohn, supra note 1.
110
Chishti & Mittelstadt, supra note 2.
105
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these individuals, the immigration courts will be the final arbiter regarding
whether they will be deported from the country or permitted to remain.111
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) vests power in immigration
judges (IJs) to conduct removal proceedings.112 Lacking the robust tenure
protections of Article III judges113 or even ALJs,114 an immigration judge is
defined as “an attorney whom the Attorney General appoints” and who is
“subject to such supervision and shall perform such duties as the Attorney
General shall prescribe”.115 According to EOIR, the agency within the
Department of Justice in which immigration judges serve, there are
approximately 330 such judges in 58 immigration courts across the nation.116
These trial-level officials determine in the first instance whether a given
noncitizen falls within one of the expansive statutory grounds for being
“inadmissible”117 or “deportable,”118 as charged by Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) prosecutors.119 If so, they determine whether the individual is
eligible for, and warrants, a discretionary grant of relief from removal.120 In
some cases, they also are charged with determining whether a detained alien
should be released on bond or parole pending the outcome of removal
proceedings.121 Noncitizen-respondents as well as government prosecutors may
appeal an adverse determination by the IJ to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), an appellate body currently consisting of twenty-one members appointed
111
See supra note 11 (describing denial of immigration court hearings for certain classes of removable
noncitizens).
112
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012).
113
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
114
See Barnett et al., supra note 20, at 7–8 (describing independence of ALJs as compared to other agency
adjudicators such as immigration judges).
115
8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2012).
116
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-ofthe-chief-immigration-judge (last visited Aug. 20, 2018).
117
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012).
118
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012).
119
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012) (“An immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for deciding the
inadmissibility or deportability of an alien.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (“Unless otherwise specified in this
chapter, a proceeding under this section shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an
alien may be admitted to the United States or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the United
States.”); see also EOIR: AN AGENCY GUIDE, supra note 5 (describing role of DHS attorneys in prosecuting
removal proceedings); ABA, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 1–9 (same).
120
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A) (addressing immigration judge authority to review applications for relief
from removal); see also, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012) (setting forth statutory prerequisites for
discretionary grants of relief from removal in the form of asylum); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012) (same for
discretionary grants of relief from removal based on crimes); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)–(b) (2012) (same for
discretionary grants of relief in the form of cancellation of removal).
121
See supra note 9.
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by the Attorney General.122 In a limited set of cases, a noncitizen may appeal an
adverse ruling by the BIA to the federal courts of appeals.123 In 2016 alone,
nearly 330,000 new matters were filed in immigration courts, including over
237,000 new removal proceedings and over 63,000 bond determinations.124 The
political, demographic, and humanitarian interests at stake in removal
proceedings are massive.
C. Emerging Tools to Influence Immigration Adjudication
The central importance of immigration courts to national immigration policy
has led the current Administration to expand political control over removal
proceedings. Attorney General Jeff Sessions has addressed these courts
repeatedly to emphasize the President’s policy priorities. In remarks during the
EOIR’s Legal Training Program, he asserted, “[a]ll of us should agree that, by
definition, we ought to have zero illegal immigration in this country,” and
reminded IJs in attendance that they are required to “conduct designated
proceedings ‘subject to such supervision and shall perform such duties as the
Attorney General shall prescribe.’”125 To that end, the Administration has
instituted wide-ranging reforms, eliminating the power of IJs to grant
“administrative closure” in cases; altering the procedures and standards for
considering asylum claims; purporting to prohibit the release of detained aliens;
and implementing a series of managerial reforms including an ambitious hiring
initiative, the introduction of performance metrics, and additional supervisory
measures to ensure that the decisions of immigration judges conform to the
President’s immigration agenda. Consistent with Trump’s campaign promise to
deport all “illegals,” these reforms appear designed to maximize the number of
noncitizens ordered deported and minimize the number who are allowed to
remain in the United States.

122
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2018) (establishing seventeen-member Board of Immigration Appeals); 8
C.F.R. § 1003.3(a)(1) (2018) (allowing for either party to appeal IJ decisions to the BIA); Executive Office for
Immigration Review: Expanding the Size of the Board of Immigration Appeals, 83 Fed. Reg. 8321, 8321 (Feb.
27, 2018) (expanding BIA membership to 21).
123
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (2012) (denying judicial review over, inter alia, denials of discretionary relief
from removal and decisions involving criminal aliens); see generally Gerald L. Neuman, Federal Courts Issues
in Immigration Law, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1661, 1664 (2000) (identifying limitations on judicial review over removal
orders).
124
EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 10, at A7.
125
Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review Legal
Training Program in Washington, D.C. (June 11, 2018) [hereinafter Sessions Remarks at Legal Training].
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1. Administrative Closure
Attorney General Sessions has acted to eliminate IJs’ power to grant
temporary relief from removal in the form of “administrative closure” in
removal proceedings.126 IJs had used this device since at least the late 1980s to
remove a case from the court’s active docket, meaning that removal proceedings
would be halted unless and until a DHS prosecutor acted to reinstate
proceedings.127 As the Fifth Circuit noted, “administrative closure may be
appropriate to await an action or event that is relevant to immigration
proceedings but is outside the control of the parties or the court and may not
occur for a significant or undetermined period of time.”128 The prototypical case
in which such relief might be awarded would be for an undocumented alien with
a legal permanent resident spouse whose application for naturalization is
pending.129 An immigration judge might administratively close removal
proceedings against such an individual given that the alien will become eligible
for permanent resident status as soon as the spouse’s naturalization application
is approved.130 Immigration courts thus used this tool as a matter of docket
control,131 ensuring that only high-priority cases, i.e., those in which the alien
had little likelihood of obtaining legal status, remained on the active docket.132
In fiscal year 2016, 35% of all initial case completions in removal proceedings
resulted in an administrative closure.133 According to the Attorney General, IJs
and the BIA granted administrative closure in more than 215,000 cases over the
six years preceding October 2017.134
In May of 2018, however, the Attorney General exercised refer-and-review
authority in Castro-Tum, involving a grant of administrative closure to an

126

Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 281 (A.G. 2018).
Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688, 695 (BIA 2012); In re W-Y-U, 27 I. & N. Dec. 17, 17–18 (BIA 2017).
128
Hernandez-Castillo v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 199, 207 (5th Cir. 2017).
129
Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 696.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 694 (characterizing administrative closure as “a tool to regulate proceedings, that is, to manage
an Immigration Judge’s calendar (or the Board’s docket)”).
132
Id. at 696 (listing considerations for granting administrative closure as “including but not limited to:
(1) the reason administrative closure is sought; (2) the basis for any opposition to administrative closure; (3) the
likelihood the respondent will succeed on any petition, application, or other action he or she is pursuing outside
of removal proceedings; (4) the anticipated duration of the closure; (5) the responsibility of either party, if any,
in contributing to any current or anticipated delay; and (6) the ultimate outcome of removal proceedings (for
example, termination of the proceedings or entry of a removal order) when the case is re[-]calendared before the
Immigration Judge or the appeal is reinstated before the Board”).
133
The total number of initial case completions in removal proceedings was 137,875, of which 48,285
resulted in administrative closure. EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 10, at C2, C5.
134
Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 272 (A.G. 2018).
127
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unaccompanied minor.135 In that case, the IJ at the trial level granted
administrative closure, but the BIA vacated on appeal by the government.136
Rather than letting the BIA opinion stand, Attorney General Sessions requested
briefing from the parties and interested amici on the legality of administrative
closure generally.137 In his final decision, Sessions concluded that neither IJs nor
the BIA possess authority to grant this form of relief.138
2. Asylum Claims
The Attorney General has also reshaped the adjudication of asylum claims
after repeatedly expressing skepticism over the credibility of such claimants. In
remarks to the EOIR, Sessions asserted, “We . . . have dirty immigration lawyers
who are encouraging their otherwise unlawfully present clients to make false
claims of asylum . . . .”139 According to him, “[s]aying a few simple words
[establishing a credible fear of persecution] is now transforming a
straightforward arrest and immediate return into a probable release and a hearing
. . . .”140 He was especially critical of the high rates at which aliens succeed in
establishing a credible fear of persecution, stating that “any adjudicatory system
with a grant rate of nearly [90%] is inherently flawed.”141 He repeated these
sentiments in a more recent speech before the EOIR, asserting that “the vast
majority of the current asylum claims are not valid,” and characterizing “abuse”
of the asylum system as “one of our major difficulties today.”142
To that end, he has twice exercised the refer-and-review power to influence
asylum adjudications. In In re E-F-H-L-, he vacated a BIA decision holding that
asylum claimants are entitled to an evidentiary hearing to establish their
claims.143 At the trial level, the IJ concluded that respondent’s written
application for relief failed to establish a prima facie claim for asylum and thus
denied an evidentiary hearing.144 On review, the BIA in 2014 vacated and
remanded, emphasizing regulations making clear that asylum applications shall

135

Id. at 273.
Id. at 277–80.
137
Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 187, 187 (A.G. 2018).
138
Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 281, 292–93 (A.G. 2018).
139
Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review in Falls
Church, Va. (Oct. 12, 2017) [hereinafter Sessions Remarks at Falls Church].
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Sessions Remarks at Legal Training, supra note 125.
143
In re E-F-H-L-, 27 I.& N. Dec. 226, 226 (A.G. 2018).
144
Id.
136
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be determined “after an evidentiary hearing.”145 In a precedent-setting published
opinion, it concluded, “in the ordinary course of removal proceedings, an
applicant for asylum . . . is entitled to a hearing on the merits of the applications,
including an opportunity to provide oral testimony and other evidence, without
first having to establish prima facie eligibility for the requested relief.”146 Four
years later, on March 5, 2018, the Attorney General—with no apparent notice to
respondent or other interested parties—vacated the BIA’s decision on the
ground that the applicant had since withdrawn his asylum application (to pursue
lawful status on the basis of a family relationship), which in his opinion rendered
the BIA’s decision “moot.”147 In doing so, Sessions summarily eliminated the
precedential decision entitling asylum seekers to an evidentiary hearing before
an IJ.
The Attorney General also utilized the refer-and-review mechanism to reject
the BIA’s longstanding precedent in In re A-B-.148 For years, the BIA had held
that victims of domestic violence could in certain circumstances qualify as being
persecuted on the basis of membership in a “particular social group” for
purposes of obtaining asylum.149 In June of this year, however, the Attorney
General overruled that precedent, promulgating a new interpretation of the
asylum statute to exclude victims of private crimes.150 His opinion states:
Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence or gang
violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for
asylum. While I do not decide that violence inflicted by nongovernmental actors may never serve as a basis for an asylum or
withholding [from removal] application based on membership in a
particular social group, in practice such claims are unlikely to satisfy
the statutory grounds for proving group persecution that the
government is unable or unwilling to address. The mere fact that a
country may have problems effectively policing certain crimes—such
as domestic violence or gang violence—or that certain populations are
more likely to be victims or crime, cannot itself establish an asylum
claim.151

In these ways, the Administration has exerted control over the adjudication of
asylum claims in immigration courts.

145
146
147
148
149
150
151

In re E-F-H-L-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 319, 323–24 (BIA 2014).
Id. at 324.
In re E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 226.
In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 320 (A.G. 2018).
See In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 391–92 (BIA 2014).
In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320.
Id.
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3. Detention
The current Administration has also purported to prohibit the release of
noncitizens pending the outcome of removal proceedings. Pursuant to statute,
large segments of the removable population are subject to mandatory
detention.152 For those who are not subject to mandatory detention, enforcement
officials within the Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) determine in the first instance whether the individual will be
detained or released on bond or parole pending removal proceedings.153 Once
charges are filed in immigration court, the noncitizen is entitled to seek a bond
rehearing before the immigration judge,154 in which the judge engages in an
individualized determination as to whether the alien poses a flight risk or danger
to the community.155
Almost immediately upon assuming office however, President Trump
announced through Executive Order 13,767, “[i]t is the policy of the [E]xecutive
[B]ranch to . . . detain individuals apprehended on suspicion of violating Federal
or State law, including Federal immigration law, pending further proceedings
regarding those violations.”156 Subsequently, Attorney General Sessions
specified, “we will now be detaining all adults who are apprehended at the
border.”157
The extent to which IJs—or indeed enforcement officers within ICE—are
complying with this directive remains unclear. Certainly, not all aliens in
removal proceedings are being detained; and among those who were detained at
one point, a nontrivial number have subsequently been released.158 Nonetheless,
immigration court records compiled by the Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse (TRAC) show a dramatic increase in the percentage of
noncitizens in removal proceedings who are detained. In April 2018, the most

152
See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (sustaining
mandatory detention provisions against statutory and constitutional challenge).
153
8 C.F.R. § 236.1(b)(1) (2018).
154
8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19, 1236.1(d) (2018). For an empirical study examining the decision-making of IJs
in bond proceedings, see Ryo, Detained Study, supra note 9.
155
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRIGATION REVIEW, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
IMMIGRATION JUDGE, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 141 (“If the alien is eligible for bond, the
Immigration Judge considers whether the alien’s release would pose a danger to property or persons, whether
the alien is likely to appear for further immigration proceedings, and whether the alien is a threat to national
security.”),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2017/11/02/practicemanual.pdf#
page=146.
156
Exec. Order 13,767, § 2(b)–(c) (Jan. 25, 2017).
157
Sessions Remarks at Nogales, supra note 107.
158
See infra Figure 1.
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recent month for which full data are available, 41% of all removal cases involved
a detained alien, as compared to only 18% in April 2016 during the prior
administration.159 At the same time, the number of aliens who previously were
detained but had since been released, as a percentage of all aliens in removal
proceedings, dropped to 16% in April 2018 from 21% two years prior.160 Figure
1 below shows the total number of aliens detained in cases initiated in each
month of the Trump Administration and the last year of the preceding
Administration; it also shows the total number of aliens released after detention
in such cases.161

The divergence between the number of noncitizens detained versus the
number released after prior detention is particularly surprising given that the
current Administration purports to no longer prioritize categories of aliens for
removal.162 One would expect that the current Administration’s decision to cast
a wider net—initiating removal proceedings against aliens regardless of criminal
history or length of residence in the United States—would lead to a higher
number of aliens released pending removal proceedings than in prior years,
when removals targeted criminal aliens who arguably pose a higher risk to
159
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/nta/ (last
visited Aug. 20, 2018) (on file with author).
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2017 ICE
ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 1 (2018), https://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics/2017
(stating that the DHS has “directed that classes or categories of removable aliens are no longer exempted from
potential enforcement”).
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community safety or recent arrivals who arguably pose a higher flight risk. Yet
the evidence suggests precisely the opposite. Today, even though a longtime
lawful resident with a minor drug conviction arguably is as likely to be subject
to removal proceedings as a violent criminal, aliens as a whole are far less likely
to be released after detention than in prior years.
Importantly, the data do not identify whether a decision to release was made
by enforcement officers within DHS or in bond rehearings before IJs. Thus,
much of the shift may be attributable to DHS employing a more aggressive
detention policy.163 IJs retain, however, formal authority to release any alien who
is not subject to statutory mandatory detention provisions,164 and the low rates
of releases are not likely to be due to enforcement officers alone. Indeed, a
lawsuit filed in January 2018 alleges that some IJs have begun to refuse to
conduct bond rehearings altogether.165
4. Managerial Reforms to Reduce Backlog of Pending Cases
The Trump Administration has also instituted a series of reforms to address
a mounting backlog of cases pending in the immigration courts. As of June 2018,
there was a backlog of 700,000 cases, triple the figure from nine years prior.166
In response, the Attorney General has launched an ambitious hiring initiative
and acted to significantly limit case processing times. While ostensibly
managerial, these reforms are likely to alter outcomes in individual immigration
proceedings.
Hiring Initiative. In April 2017, the Attorney General announced a “new,
streamlined hiring plan” to dramatically expand the number of immigration
judges.167 As of November 2017, the Administration had hired more than 61
new IJs—1/5 of the current IJ corps168—and plans to hire 100 more in 2018.169
At the administrative appeals level, the Administration has expanded the Board
of Immigration Appeals, which determines which decisions to publish as

163
See Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan, Acting
Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. et al. (Feb. 20, 2017).
164
See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.41(a) (2018).
165
Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
at 2, Palacios v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-00026 (W.D.N.C. 2018).
166
Sessions Remarks at Legal Training, supra note 125.
167
Sessions Remarks at Nogales, supra note 107.
168
McHenry Testimony, supra note 80, at 3.
169
Sessions Remarks at Legal Training, supra note 125.
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precedents by majority vote,170 from seventeen members to twenty-one
members.171
Details have not yet emerged on how current hiring practices depart from
past procedures, and whether they avoid the legal pitfalls associated with the
politicized hiring practices documented in the Inspector General 2008 report.172
In April 2018, however, congressional Democrats sent a letter to the Department
of Justice expressing concern that the Department may be screening candidates
on political or ideological grounds.173 The letter cites reports of individuals who
were appointed to the immigration bench during the Obama Administration
pending background checks, but whose applications subsequently were subject
to extended delays and in at least one case ultimately rejected with little
explanation.174 While the Department of Justice has denied the allegations,
members of Congress continue to press for an independent investigation.175
Even assuming current practices avoid the use of ideology or political
affiliation in hiring, these new IJ hires do not enjoy the same level of
independence as longtime members of this administrative bench. All new IJs
serve a two-year probationary period before enjoying civil service protections,
unlike most types of non-ALJ adjudicators, who have no probationary period at
all.176 Moreover, Attorney General Sessions has taken pains to point out to IJs
that they serve at his pleasure, reminding them during their Legal Training
Program that they are “subject to such supervision and shall perform such duties
as the Attorney General shall prescribe.”177 In addition, the Administration has
instituted structural changes to expand oversight over IJs serving in the field,
increasing the number of supervisors while also creating a new Office of Policy
within EOIR to “better coordinate initiatives to address the case load, to
170

8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2018).
Executive Office for Immigration Review: Expanding the Size of the Board of Immigration Appeals,
83 Fed. Reg. 8321, 8321 (Feb. 27, 2018).
172
See DOJ INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
173
Letter from Elijah E. Cummings, Lloyd Doggett, Joaquin Castro, & Donald S. Beyer, Jr., Members of
Cong., to Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Apr. 17, 2018).
174
Id.
175
Tal Kopan, Immigration Judge Applicant Says Trump Administration Blocked Her over Politics CNN:
POLITICS (June 21, 2018, 10:40 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/21/politics/immigration-judge-applicantsays-trump-administration-blocked-her-over-politics/index.html.
176
Compare Oversight of the Executive Office of Immigration Review: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., & Int’l Law Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2 (2008)
(statement of Kevin A. Ohlson, Dir., Exec. Office for Immigration Review), https://judiciary.house.gov/_files/
hearings/pdf/JointDOJ080923.pdf (noting two-year probationary period for newly hired IJs), with BARNETT ET
AL., supra note 20, at 40 (noting that of the thirty-seven types of non-ALJ adjudicators identified across federal
agencies, only seventeen are placed on probation upon hiring).
177
Sessions Remarks at Legal Training, supra note 125.
171
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eliminate existing process redundancies across multiple components, and to
more effectively oversee strategic planning, analytics, and internal
communications.”178
Expediting Case Processing. Consistent with President Trump’s stated
policy of “expedit[ing] determinations of apprehended individuals’ claims of
eligibility to remain in the United States,”179 the Administration has initiated
reforms to significantly limit case processing times. After renegotiating the
collective bargaining agreement with the IJs’ union to eliminate prohibitions on
measuring and evaluating individual performance,180 the Attorney General
imposed new performance metrics for these judges.181 Pursuant to these metrics,
an IJ will be evaluated as having “satisfactory performance” only if he or she
satisfies three measures.182 First, he or she must complete at least 700 cases each
year.183 Second, remand rates by the BIA or the circuit courts must be less than
15%.184 Third, he or she must meet at least half of a list of performance
benchmarks such as completing 85% of detained removal cases within three
days of the merits hearing; holding merits hearings on the initial scheduled
hearing date in 95% of all cases; and completing all reviews of preliminary
credible fear and reasonable fear assessments on the initial hearing date.185
These performance metrics build on separate efforts to limit immigration
judges’ ability to enter continuances in cases. In July 2017, the Administration
amended the Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum governing
immigration courts to require judges to submit written documentation showing
“good cause” warranting the grant of any continuance.186 Although a recent
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that the
vast majority of continuances were due to resource constraints on the part of
178

McHenry Testimony, supra note 80, at 5.
Exec. Order 13,767, § 2(c) (Jan. 25, 2017).
180
Maria Sacchetti, Immigration Judges Say Proposed Quotas from Justice Dept. Threaten Independence,
WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration/immigration-judges-sayproposed-quotas-from-justice-dept-threaten-independence/2017/10/12/3ed86992-aee1-11e7-be94-fabb0f1e
9ffb_story.html.
181
Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., U.S Dep’t of Justice, to the Exec. Office for
Immigration Review (Dec. 5, 2017).
182
Memorandum from James R. McHenry, Dir., Exec. Office for Immigration Review, to All Immigration
Judges, Exec. Office for Immigration Review (Mar. 30, 2018).
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Memorandum from MaryBeth Keller, Chief Immigration Judge, Exec. Office for Immigration Review,
to All Immigration Judges et al., Exec. Office for Immigration Review (Jul. 31, 2017) [hereinafter Keller
Memorandum] (detailing new policies and procedures regarding continuances); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2018)
(providing that immigration judges may grant continuances where “good cause shown”).
179
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immigration courts themselves,187 the memorandum targets those requested by
noncitizen respondents as warranting particular scrutiny, including those
requested to obtain counsel or for attorney preparation.188
Then, in March 2018, the Attorney General indicated his intent to review the
BIA’s decision in In re L-A-B-R-, requesting parties to brief the issue of whether
“good cause” exists for an IJ to grant a continuance in a removal proceeding to
allow a collateral matter—such as a pending petition for legal permanent
resident status—to be adjudicated.189 In August, the Attorney General issued a
final opinion, emphasizing that “the good-cause requirement is an important
check on immigration judges’ authority that reflects the public interest in
expeditious enforcement of the immigration laws . . . .”190 While he concluded
that the decision on a motion for a continuance should turn primarily on “the
likelihood that the alien will receive the pursued collateral relief” and that such
“relief will materially affect the outcome of the removal proceedings,” he also
directed courts to consider other factors, including “DHS’s position on the
motion for continuance [and] concerns of administrative efficiency.”191 In doing
so, he rejected the BIA’s interpretation of the Third Circuit’s opinion in Hashmi
v. Attorney General, which held that denying a continuance solely to achieve
case-completion goals was “impermissibly arbitrary.”192 The Attorney General
concluded that while case-completion goals should not constitute the sole reason
for a denial, they should be considered as one of several factors in the
decision.193 Additionally, he specified that continuances should be denied where
the collateral relief sought constitutes a challenge to a criminal conviction or
where the noncitizen respondent has a pending application for a family- or
employment-based visa that is currently unavailable due to backlogs.194 In these
ways, the Attorney General ensured that the good-cause standard imposes a
robust “substantive requirement” to “limit[] the discretion of immigration
judges.”195
Whether this set of reforms can appropriately be characterized as politically
influenced may be contested. No one disputes that immigration courts suffer
from extraordinary backlogs and have long been in desperate need for reform.
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195

GAO 2017 REPORT, supra note 14.
Keller Memorandum, supra note 186, at 4–5.
In re L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 245, 245 (A.G. 2018).
In re L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. 405, 406 (A.G. 2018).
Id. at 415.
531 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2008).
27 I. & N. at 416–17.
Id. at 417–18.
Id. at 405.
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Currently, over 700,000 cases are pending in the immigration courts.196 In 2015,
the median case completion time stood at 286 days.197 From this perspective,
reforms focused on the timely and efficient resolution of cases may constitute
precisely the sort of managerial oversight we would demand from the leadership
in any hierarchical organization.
Yet in the context of immigration cases, limits on the length of removal
proceedings are inextricably linked to case outcomes, heavily favoring
deportation rather than relief from removal.198 In the adversarial system between
the government and a noncitizen-respondent, time limits on proceedings almost
always work in favor of the government because in the vast majority of cases,
the noncitizen’s inadmissibility or deportability is not at issue. Grounds for
removal, such as a lack of a valid visa or the existence of a criminal conviction,
are relatively easy to establish. Consequently, the bulk of proceedings focus on
whether the alien is eligible for, and warrants, a grant of discretionary relief from
removal.199 The alien bears the burden on this issue and must develop evidence
to show, for example, a reasonable fear of persecution if removed, strong ties to
the community, work history, or hardship to U.S. family members if removal
were effectuated.200
The Administration itself has acknowledged the connection between the
length of removal proceedings and case outcomes. In a document entitled
“Backgrounder on EOIR Strategies for Caseload Reduction Plan,” the
Administration attributes the backlog in immigration proceedings to
196
See Sessions Remarks at Legal Training, supra note 125; see also McHenry Testimony, supra note 80
(noting that in October 2017, approximately 640,000 cases remained pending in the immigration courts).
197
GAO 2017 REPORT, supra note 14. The GAO Report notes that the median time to completion for cases
involving detained individuals, which are prioritized for case processing, was only 28 days, but the median time
for non-detained cases was 535 days. Id. at 26.
198
By contrast, limits on case processing times have the opposite effect in disability adjudications in the
Social Security Administration, where the burden of proof rests on the government. See HAROLD J. KRENT &
SCOTT MORRIS, ACHIEVING GREATER CONSISTENCY IN SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY ADJUDICATION: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY AND SUGGESTED REFORMS 50–51, 54 (2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/Achieving_Greater_Consistency_Final_Report_4-3-2013_clean.pdf.
199
See ABA, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 2–9 (“In practice, many cases are
resolved at the master calendar hearing, if the respondent admits to removability and only seeks voluntary
departure. However, if removability is disputed or if relief other than voluntary departure is sought, the
proceeding enters the second stage—an individual hearing on the merits, which is usually set for a separate date.
At this hearing, the immigration judge makes a decision based on evidence and facts disputed by the respondent
and on any other matters deemed relevant.”) (footnote omitted).
200
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A)–(B) (2012); see also, e.g., Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467, 467, 468, 472–73
(BIA 2002) (holding that a single mother was eligible for cancelation of removal “because she demonstrated
that her United States citizen children . . . will suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship upon her
removal to her native country”); Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584–85 (BIA 1978) (outlining factors favorable to
an alien in removal proceedings).
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discretionary grants of relief from removal, which “have slowed down the
adjudication . . . and incentivized further illegal immigration.”201 Moreover, the
pressure to resolve cases quickly cannot be extricated from the Administration’s
repeated assertions that removal proceedings are plagued by meritless claims
filed by noncitizens. The Attorney General has been particularly vocal in his
conviction that baseless asylum claims are a major cause of the backlog in
removal proceedings.202 The Administration has also expressed skepticism
toward claims brought by unaccompanied alien children (UACs) entitled to
special protections. Recent amendments to the Operating Policies and Procedure
Manual emphasize, “there is an incentive to misrepresent accompaniment status
or age in order to attempt to qualify for the benefits associated with UAC status”
and direct IJs to “be vigilant in adjudicating cases of a purported UAC.”203 These
statements suggest that managerial and structural reforms targeting timely case
completions are not expected to be outcome-neutral. IJs plausibly will feel
pressure to expedite deportation orders, rather than to expedite relief from
removal.
It is still too early to assess the extent to which these reforms have influenced
particular case outcomes, but the initial data suggest a correlation. According to
statistics released by the Department of Justice, immigration courts issued
127,570 final decisions between February 1, 2017 and November 30, 2017, a
16.6% increase from the same period the prior year.204 The total number of
removal orders issued in that time period (87,063), by contrast, grew by 30% as
compared to the prior year.205 These figures suggest that the percentage of
completed cases resulting in a removal order was far higher in 2017 than in
2016.206

201

Backgrounder on EOIR Strategic Caseload Reduction Plan, supra note 4.
Sessions Remarks at Falls Church, supra note 139.
203
Memorandum from MaryBeth Keller, Chief Immigration Judge, Exec. Office for Immigration Review,
to All Immigration Judges et al., Exec. Office for Immigration Review (Dec. 20, 2017) (detailing new policies
and procedures regarding juveniles and UACs). The memorandum also instructs IJs not to grant relief from
removal solely on the basis of “the best interest of the child.” Id. It further states that “[a]lthough juvenile cases
may present sympathetic allegations, Immigration Judges must be mindful that they are unbiased arbitrators of
the law and not advocates for either party . . . .” Id. It asserts, “although vague, speculative, or generalized
testimony by a child witness is not necessarily an indicator of dishonesty,” “legal requirements, including
credibility standards and burdens of proof, are not relaxed or obviated for juvenile respondents” and such
vagueness and generality in a child’s testimony may “be insufficient by itself to be found credible or to meet an
applicable burden of proof.” Id.
204
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Attorney General Sessions Issues Memo
Outlining Principles to Ensure that the Adjudication of Immigration Cases Serves the National Interest (Dec. 6,
2017).
205
Id.
206
Id.
202
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Contrary to conventional assumptions, the Trump Administration has sought
to ensure that the removal of noncitizens are controlled not by independent
adjudicators, but rather by the Administration’s political leadership. Presidential
administration has finally penetrated agency adjudications.
III. ASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL ADJUDICATION
Setting aside one’s policy view on whether we should be deporting more, or
fewer, noncitizens from the United States, the Trump Administration’s reforms
to immigration proceedings raise thorny normative questions about the extent to
which agency adjudications should be insulated from political influence.207
While commentators often assert that agency adjudicators must be independent
from presidential control,208 this Article argues that the normative assessment is
more complex. This Part begins by setting forth the normative factors at stake
when administrative adjudications become politicized. It then evaluates the
recent immigration court reforms against these metrics.
A. The Normative Stakes
Our legal culture imposes a heavy presumption of adjudicative
independence from politics.209 The demand for such independence is less
absolute in the administrative context than in the Article III context, however.210
The extent to which agency adjudications are insulated from political
interference should accommodate both the need to protect the interests of the
individual as well as the need for democratic accountability.211 It should also
adhere to the separation-of-powers principles necessary to protect against
arbitrary unilateral action.212

207
For an empirical inquiry into public norms about the legitimacy of Executive actions, see Cary
Coglianese & Kristin Firth, Separation of Powers Legitimacy: An Empirical Inquiry into Norms About Executive
Power, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1872 (2016).
208
Supra note 21 (listing sources).
209
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (establishing life tenure and salary protections for federal judges);
THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78, 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining need to protect judiciary from political
influence).
210
See generally PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 79, at 1004–06 (describing differences between
Article III adjudication and federal agency adjudication). See also F. Andrew Hessick, Consenting to
Adjudication Outside the Article III Courts, 71 VAND. L. REV. 715, 725–29 (2018) (same); Mila Sohoni, Agency
Adjudication and Judicial Nondelegation: An Article III Canon, 107 NW. L. REV. 1569, 1581–84 (2013) (same).
211
Legomsky, War on Independence, supra note 17, at 390 (acknowledging cost of decisional
independence on norms of political accountability); Taylor, supra note 22, at 485 (noting trade-off between
decisional independence and policy consistency and uniformity).
212
Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1036–
39 (2011) (examining importance of allocation of power between actors within a given agency); Gillian E.
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1. Democratic Responsiveness and Protecting Individual Interests
The degree to which agency adjudications are insulated from presidential
influence should reflect, in part, a context-specific balancing between the need
to protect individual interests on the one hand and norms of electoral
responsiveness on the other.213
Advocates of presidential control over agency decision-making generally
argue that such control helps ensure that the decisions of unelected bureaucrats
are held to democratic account. As Kagan described, “presidential leadership
establishes an electoral link between the public and the bureaucracy, increasing
the latter’s responsiveness to the former.”214 The Supreme Court itself relied on
this premise to justify judicial deference to agencies’ interpretations of statutory
ambiguities in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council:
“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive
is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to
make such policy choices . . . .”215 From this view, presidential control
legitimates agency decision-making by ensuring that such decisions are
responsive to the electorate.
This democratic-accountability claim surfaces most frequently in defenses
of presidential control over agency rulemaking, but it arguably applies to agency
adjudications as well. Agency adjudicators are not limited to resolving disputes
between discrete parties; as described in section I.C., they may also establish
binding national policy.216 To the extent the policy’s legitimacy rests on being
traceable to the democratically accountable President, such legitimacy would
not appear to depend on whether the policy was promulgated through
adjudication rather than rulemaking.217
Yet even if one accepts the primacy of democratic accountability as the
touchstone of legitimacy, the extent to which presidential control actually
Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J.
423, 429–30 (2009) [hereinafter Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship] (examining importance of internal
separation of powers to empower external actors to keep Executive power in check).
213
See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16–17 (1962) (coining term “countermajoritarian difficulty” to describe inherent tension
between adjudicative system and norms of electoral governance).
214
Kagan, supra note 19, at 2332; see also ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE
UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 75–76 (2010); Pierce, Jr., supra note 28, at 114–15; Watts, supra
note 28, at 688–89, 692.
215
467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
216
See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.
217
Vermeule, Agency Independence, supra note 19, at 1212.
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renders agency decisions more responsive to the electorate is contested.218 In the
rulemaking context, political scientists have noted the weak connection between
a presidential victory and electoral preferences for a specific policy choice, e.g.,
ramped-up removal of noncitizens.219 The adjudicative context exacerbates this
disconnect, as adjudications simply are less publicly salient than rulemaking.220
More fundamentally, agency adjudications differ from rulemaking actions
because the legitimacy of the former does not rest entirely—or even primarily—
on notions of democratic accountability. Even Kagan, who famously
championed the presidential control model, conceded that in the context of
adjudications, “which apply to and affect discrete individuals and firms,”
“presidential participation in . . . whatever form, would contravene procedural
norms and inject an inappropriate influence into the resolution of
controversies.”221 A recent report published by the National Association of the
Administrative Law Judiciary describes the importance of individual protections
in agency adjudications:
Ultimately, administrative adjudication . . . is about the delivery of due
process to the individuals and businesses that are subject to
government regulation . . . . A strong commitment to ensuring the
independence of the administrative adjudicator . . . is the greatest
protection for our citizens, and the most important assurance of due
process for taxpayers and businesses that rely upon independent
administrative judges to resolve fairly and impartially their disputes
with the government.222

From this perspective, the legitimacy of agency adjudications rests in large part
on the adjudicative process’s ability to protect individual interests against
majoritarian preferences.
A pair of early cases familiar to students of administrative law illustrates this
principle. In Londoner v. City of Denver, the Supreme Court held that due
process required an oral hearing for property owners before a tax assessment
could be imposed on them.223 In Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of
Equalization of Colorado, by contrast, the Court held that property owners

218

See Kitrosser, supra note 21.
See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency
Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 450 (2010).
220
Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living, Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253,
255–56 (1986) (noting that adjudication is less publicly salient than rulemaking).
221
Kagan, supra note 19, at 2362–63.
222
Gilbert & Cohen, supra note 55, at 254.
223
210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908).
219
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opposing a city-wide increase in the valuation of taxable property were not
entitled to such due process protections.224 The Court in Bi-Metallic justified its
departure from Londoner as follows: “In [Londoner, a] relatively small number
of persons was concerned, who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon
individual grounds . . . . But that decision is far from reaching a general
determination dealing only with the principle upon which all the assessments in
a county had been laid.”225
Together, these cases show that the Constitution mandates procedural due
process protections where a government agency engages in “adjudicative”
decision-making, impacting specific individuals, but not where the agency
engages in “legislative” decision-making, which is broadly applicable to the
public at large. As others have explained, this distinction rests on a particular
view of the political process as incapable of protecting the interests of discrete
individuals against majoritarian politics; an individual targeted by a government
action is unlikely to be able to mobilize the broad support sufficient to protect
her interests through the ballot box.226 In these circumstances, the only way to
protect the individual’s interest is to provide due process, which at its most
fundamental, requires an independent, impartial decision maker.227 The lesson
from Londoner and Bi-Metallic is that majoritarian preferences simply do not
play the same dominating role in adjudicative decisions; on the contrary, they
may need to give way to protect the interests of individual parties in a
proceeding.
Justice Powell’s concurrence in INS v. Chadha similarly articulates a theory
of adjudication rooted in the need to protect individual interests from
majoritarian preferences.228 Chadha involved the constitutionality of a statute
which delegated authority to grant discretionary relief from deportation while at
the same time reserving Congress’s power to override the grant of relief by
majority vote in either the House or Senate.229 The majority opinion authored by
Chief Justice Burger invalidated the one-house legislative veto as an
impermissible exercise of “legislative” power departing from constitutional
lawmaking requirements of bicameralism and presentment.230 Justice Powell, by

224

239 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1915).
Id. at 445–46.
226
See 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 9.2, at 743 (5th ed. 2010).
227
See Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279 n.71 (1975) (ranking an
“unbiased tribunal” as the most important of due process protections).
228
462 U.S. 919, 959–60 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring).
229
Id. at 923–25.
230
Id. at 944, 947, 951–52, 958.
225

KIM_GALLEYPROOFS

38

9/26/2018 9:59 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68:1

contrast, concluded that the statute did not constitute an exercise of “legislative”
power at all, but rather an impermissible exercise by Congress of the
“adjudicative” power:
On its face, the House’s action appears clearly adjudicatory. The
House did not enact a general rule; rather it made its own
determination that six specific persons did not comply with certain
statutory criteria . . . . [T]he House’s assumption of this function . . .
raises the very danger the Framers sought to avoid—the exercise of
unchecked power. In deciding whether Chadha deserves to be
deported, Congress is not subject to any internal constraints that
prevent it from arbitrarily depriving him of the right to remain in the
country . . . . The only effective constraint on Congress’ power is
political, but Congress is most accountable politically when it
prescribes rules of general applicability. When it decides rights of
specific persons, those rights are subject to “the tyranny of a shifting
majority.”231

Chadha involved congressional action, but Justice Powell’s concern about the
fair adjudication of individual interests would seem to apply to decisions
directed by a politically-motivated President as well.
In the context of agency adjudications, the balance between democratic
responsiveness and protections for individual interests simply is not the same
as in the rulemaking context. It does not follow that an individual’s interest in
an adjudicative proceeding must always prevail over the will of the majority.
Rather, the proper balance to strike will be context specific, depending on
factors such as the significance of the individual interests at stake; the extent to
which a politicized decision compromises those interests; and the degree to
which a politicized decision actually reflects the popular will.
2. Separation of Powers
The independence of agency adjudications implicates a related set of values:
those reflected in the structure of separated powers in our Constitution. At the
level of constitutional actors (President, Congress, and federal courts), agency
adjudications must remain faithful to the Congress that created the agency and
vested it with adjudicative authority. At the sub-constitutional level of the
agency itself, agency adjudicators should enjoy the degree of independence
necessary to ensure adequate checks and balances against arbitrary unilateral
action.

231

Id. at 964–66.

KIM_GALLEYPROOFS

2018]

9/26/2018 9:59 AM

THE PRESIDENT’S IMMIGRATION COURTS

39

Constitutional Actors. Agencies are firmly placed within the Executive
Branch serving under the President.232 But they are created by, and derive all
powers from, Congress.233 As such, the legitimacy of any form of agency action
depends on its fidelity to the goals of the enacting Congress.234 Congress sets
forth the procedures by which decisions, including adjudications, are to be
reached. Congress may delegate decision-making to politically insulated ALJs,
or vest decision-making authority exclusively in a presidential appointee, for
example.235 It might limit the extent to which presidential appointees can
overturn the decisions of trial-level adjudicators, or it might grant de novo
review authority.236
Congress also establishes particular policy goals in creating the agency. As
a general matter, independent career bureaucrats, steeped in a professional
culture defined by the mission of the agencies in which they serve, can protect
legislative interests when a current President’s goals diverge from those of the
Congress that enacted an agency’s organic statute.237 Indeed, political scientists
have characterized the career bureaucracy as central to mediating between
conflicting goals of Congress and the President.238 While the value of
bureaucratic independence often is associated with agency expertise in scientific
and technical fields,239 agency adjudicators also develop expertise given their
focus on limited categories of cases. Moreover, agency adjudicators who preside
over the taking of evidence are more likely to develop an accurate assessment of
the adjudicative facts at issue in a given case.240 For these reasons, preserving
the independence of agency adjudicators may enhance the legitimacy and
accuracy of their decisions, particularly where the political goals of the current
President conflict with Congress’s original intent.241

232

PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE

IN THE

UNITED STATES 171–73, 175–76, 179 (3d ed.

2016).
233
See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000) (“[N]o matter how
important, conspicuous, and controversial the issue, and regardless of how likely the public is to hold the
Executive Branch politically accountable . . . an administrative agency’s power to regulate in the public interest
must always be grounded in a valid grant of authority from Congress.”).
234
Id.
235
See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425–26 (1944)
236
See ASIMOW, supra note 54, at 33–34.
237
Strauss, The President in Administrative Law, supra note 28, at 703–04.
238
See McCubbins et al., supra note 53, at 244.
239
Wendy E. Wagner, A Place for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise with Presidential
Power, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2019, 2055 (2015).
240
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 494 (1951).
241
See Kevin M. Stack, An Administrative Jurisprudence: The Rule of Law in the Administrative State,
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1985, 2018 (2015) (discussing norm of legal coherence to mediate between enacting
Congress’s goals and the current Administration’s goals).
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Within the Agency Itself. Even within agencies, which are wholly within the
Executive Branch, separation-of-powers norms have come to play a crucial role.
Since at least the New Deal, the Executive Branch has accreted more and more
power so that it is undeniably the most powerful branch of federal
government.242 One of the central projects of administrative law has been to
replicate, within the increasingly powerful Executive Branch, the types of
checks and balances our constitutional framers mandated between branches.243
Indeed, Professor Gillian Metzger argues that such internal checks and balances
are constitutionally required, given the increasing threat of presidential
unilateralism:
The administrative state—with its bureaucracy, expert and
professional personnel, and internal institutional complexity—
performs critical constitutional functions and is the key to an
accountable, constrained, and effective [E]xecutive [B]ranch . . .
[T]he administrative state today is constitutionally obligatory,
rendered necessary by the broad statutory delegations of authority
to the [E]xecutive [B]ranch that are the defining feature of modern
government.244
Pursuant to this view, the independence of career bureaucrats within Executive
Branch agencies assumes a constitutional dimension.
Importantly, preserving the independence of agency adjudicators does not
eliminate the role of political leadership over agencies altogether. On the
contrary, political appointees may retain meaningful oversight over broad policy
choices without interfering in the decision-making processes of career

242
See Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1, 1 (1994) (“[T]he institutional system has itself been transformed . . . from a nineteenth century system
of ‘congressional government’ into a modern, presidentially led bureaucratic state . . . . The hallmark of modern
U.S. government is presidential leadership.”).
243
See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch
from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317 (2006) (“A critical mechanism to promote internal separation of powers
is bureaucracy.”); Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old
and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 235 (2016) (examining relationship between vertical
separation of powers—involving competition between constitutional branches—and horizontal separation of
powers—interactions between politically appointed agency leadership, civil service bureaucrats, and civil
society organizations). For discussion of the relationship between individual rights and separation-of-powers
norms, see Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE
L.J. 1672, 1727 (2012) (setting forth originalist account of due process rights as designed to enforce separationof-powers norms); Jonathan R. Macey, How Separation of Powers Protects Individual Liberties, 41 RUTGERS
L. REV. 813, 816 (1989) (describing separation of powers as a precondition to a system of checks and balances
necessary to protect individuals).
244
Metzger, The Administrative State Under Siege, supra note 21.
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adjudicators. The Supreme Court’s decision in Heckler v. Campbell,245
involving a denial of disability benefits, illustrates one way that bureaucratic
independence can co-exist with political leadership. Pursuant to the Social
Security Act, an individual is entitled to disability payments upon establishing
at an adjudicative hearing that her physical or mental impairment precludes her
from pursuing gainful employment in the national economy.246 Historically,
adjudicators determined the availability of such gainful employment through the
receipt of expert testimony in individual hearings.247 In 1978, however, the
agency’s political leadership promulgated regulations setting forth a matrix to
calculate the types and numbers of jobs existing in the national economy.248
Campbell challenged the use of this matrix to deny her benefits, arguing that she
was entitled to present evidence of the absence of jobs at her individualized
hearing.249 Rejecting her claim, the Supreme Court stated:
It is true that the statutory scheme contemplates that disability hearings
will be individualized determinations based on evidence adduced at a
hearing . . . . But this does not bar the Secretary from relying on
rulemaking to resolve certain classes of issues. The Court has
recognized that even where an agency’s enabling statute expressly
requires it to hold a hearing, the agency may rely on its own
rulemaking authority to determine issues that do not require case-bycase consideration.250

Heckler v. Campbell relied on the traditional distinction between adjudicative
facts, which must be resolved by the adjudicator, and legislative facts, which
may be resolved by the political leadership. The Court explained:
The first inquiry involves a determination of historic facts, and the
regulations properly require the Secretary to make these findings on
the basis of evidence adduced at a hearing . . . . The second inquiry
requires the Secretary to determine an issue that is not unique to each
claimant—the types and numbers of jobs that exist in the national
economy. This type of general factual issue may be resolved as fairly
through rulemaking as by introducing the testimony of vocational
experts at each disability hearing.251

245
246
247
248
249
250
251

461 U.S. 458, 464 (1983).
Id. at 460.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 460–62.
Id. at 463.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 467–68.
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Thus, Campbell demonstrates that even where the power to establish
adjudicative facts is allocated exclusively to an independent adjudicator, the
political leadership may retain power to establish more general legislative facts.
The independence of the initial decision maker need not eliminate the possibility
of politicized outcomes; but it does discipline them—mandating a deliberative
process more likely to result in accurate, or at least better-informed, decisions.
Even in the context of resolving individual cases, as opposed to broader
policy decisions, the independence of adjudicators need not displace political
oversight. This principle is illustrated in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Accardi v. Shaughnessy, holding that the Attorney General improperly interfered
with the BIA’s independence in adjudicating a noncitizen’s removal.252 In that
case, Accardi’s application for discretionary relief from removal had been
denied by the trial-level IJ.253 While his appeal was pending before the BIA, the
Attorney General allegedly circulated a list of “unsavory characters” whom he
wished to deport.254 The BIA subsequently affirmed the IJ’s denial of relief. On
appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Attorney General overstepped his
authority by violating his own regulations requiring the BIA to exercise
independent judgment on appeals.255 It held, “as long as the regulations
[mandating the BIA to exercise independent judgment in each case] remain
operative, the Attorney General denies himself the right to sidestep the Board or
dictate its decision in any manner.”256
The decision may appear puzzling at first, given that Congress vested
discretion personally in the Attorney General to grant or deny relief from
removal.257 Moreover, the Supreme Court acknowledged that regulations
preserved the Attorney General’s unfettered discretion to reverse any decision
of the BIA.258 Yet the holding can be understood as promoting a version of
internal separation of powers.259 The BIA’s exercise of independent judgment
in the case becomes a part of the formal record; while the Attorney General may
be free to reverse that decision, any subsequent review of the Attorney General’s

252

347 U.S. 260, 267–68 (1954).
Id. at 263.
254
Id. at 264.
255
Id. at 266–67.
256
Id. at 267.
257
Id. at 262–63.
258
Id. at 266–67.
259
Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship, supra note 212 (discussing administrative law’s separation
of functions between adjudicative functions and other agency functions); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary
Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 484 (2010) (arguing that much
of administrative law is informed by but not necessarily mandated by constitutional concerns).
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final decision—whether by a federal court or the public at large—will consider
it alongside the opinion and reasoning of the independent adjudicator. Thus,
while the Attorney General’s final decision may be motivated by political rather
than legal considerations, such motivations would be uncovered in the act of
reversal. Allowing the Attorney General to influence the agency adjudicator
before he or she exercises independent judgment evades such disclosure.260 In
this way, Accardi’s guarantee of adjudicative independence imposes a check,
though not an absolute one, on the exercise of raw political power in individual
cases.
From the separation-of-powers perspective, then, the legitimacy of political
influence over agency adjudications depends in part on the extent to which it
complies with congressional intent, as well as the extent to which it allows space
for the types of checks and balances contemplated by our constitutional framers.
As this discussion suggests, the degree of independence that should be
afforded to agency adjudications is complex and context specific. The proper
balance between individual interests and majoritarian preferences, and the need
for checks against unilateral action, will differ across agencies and even across
types of political interference within a given agency.261 This variance is
demonstrated in the next section, which evaluates the Trump Administration’s
reforms to removal proceedings along these metrics.
B. A Context-Specific Assessment of Politicized Removal Proceedings
The metrics set forth in the preceding section suggest that overall,
presidential politics should play only a limited role in removal adjudications. As
a general matter, even if the current Administration’s immigration court reforms
could be characterized as electorally responsive, the gravity of the individual
interests at stake and the need to preserve checks on unilateral power counsel
against presidential intervention.
The Trump Administration has been explicit in defending its reforms to
immigration courts as responsive to a popular mandate. Addressing IJs directly,
the Attorney General asserted: “The American people have spoken. They have
spoken in our laws and they have spoken in our elections. They want a safe,
secure border and a lawful system of immigration that actually works. Let’s

260
Cf. Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805, 860 (2015)
(suggesting that ex ante interference is more tolerable than ex post interference).
261
See Shah, The Attorney General’s Disruptive Immigration Power, supra note 17, at 139–40.
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deliver it for them.”262 In another set of remarks, this time to the Criminal Justice
Legal Foundation, he stated:
In the 2016 election, voters said loud and clear that they wanted a
lawful system of immigration that serves the national interest. They
said we’ve waited long enough. I believe that this is one of the main
reasons that President Trump won. He promised to tackle this crisis
that had been ignored or made worse by so many before him. And now
he’s doing exactly what the American people asked him to do.263

To the extent the electoral returns granted President Trump a mandate to rid the
country of “illegals,” the Administration’s efforts to ensure that all removable
aliens are in fact removed arguably are politically justified.264
But even if one agrees that the Administration’s reforms are democratically
responsive (a point that is highly contested),265 such political accountability must
be balanced against individual due process interests. Removal proceedings
epitomize the sort of individualized determinations triggering due process
protections under Londoner and Bi-Metallic, and the Supreme Court has long
recognized that noncitizens threatened with deportation are entitled to due
process protections.266 The threatened deprivation—detention and ultimately
removal—constitute unusually weighty interests,267 and noncitizens present
precisely the type of “discrete and insular minorities” whose interests are

262

Sessions Remarks at Legal Training, supra note 125.
Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks to the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Los Angeles, Cal.
(June 26, 2018).
264
This view is consistent with political theories vesting the body politic with the power to define the
composition of the polity. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS,
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 157–58 (1996) (discussing theory of immigration as part of process of national selfdefinition); Michael Walzer, The Distribution of Membership, in BOUNDARIES: NATIONAL AUTONOMY AND ITS
LIMITS 1–2, 32 (Peter Brown & Henry Shue, eds., 1981); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE
OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 31–32, 34, 62 (1983) (discussing political theory of membership in the polity).
Since the late-nineteenth century, the Supreme Court has characterized decisions relating to the exclusion and
deportation of noncitizens as fundamentally political, vested exclusively in the Congress and the President as a
power inherent in sovereignty. Catherine Y. Kim, Plenary Power in the Modern Administrative State, 96 N.C.
L. REV. 77, 79, 93 (2017).
265
See Sara Kehaulani Goo, What Americans Want to Do About Illegal Immigration, PEW RES. CENTER
(Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/08/24/what-americans-want-to-do-about-illegalimmigration/ (showing that a majority of Americans support granting path to legal citizenship for undocumented
noncitizens currently residing in the United States if they satisfy certain requirements, and only 17% support
deporting all noncitizens who are here without documentation).
266
Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 89, 91 (1903).
267
See e.g., Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 58 (2011) (“In a foundational deportation case, this Court
recognized the high stakes for an alien who has long resided in this country, and reversed an agency decision
that would ‘make his right to remain here dependent on circumstances so fortuitous and capricious.’”) (quoting
Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947)).
263
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underrepresented in political processes.268 Under these circumstances, the
independence of agency adjudicators is crucial to moderate the excesses of raw
majoritarianism.269
Presidential control over immigration adjudications also arguably
contravenes congressional intent. As mentioned earlier, the INA vests the power
to adjudicate removal proceedings personally and exclusively in IJs, not the
agency’s political leadership.270 Moreover, unlike the APA, the INA does not
purport to vest political leadership with unfettered review authority.271 These
provisions suggest that Congress contemplated individual removal decisions be
made free from political influence.272
More importantly, presidential control over removal proceedings presents a
significant threat of unfettered unilateral power in contravention of separationof-powers principles. The need for independence in immigration adjudications
is particularly acute given the virtual absence of external checks and balances.273
Congress’s ability to discipline removal decisions ex post is extremely limited—
Congress retains power to reverse an order of removal by enacting a private
immigration bill, but out of the nearly 400 such bills proposed over the past 10
years, few have been enacted.274 Indeed, it was this legislative inertia that
prompted Congress to create the one-house legislative veto subsequently
invalidated in INS v. Chadha.275 Federal courts likewise impose relatively
limited constraints on Executive Branch removal decisions. Pursuant to the
“plenary power doctrine,” federal courts have declined to impose rigorous
constitutional checks on removal decisions.276 Moreover, courts are statutorily
proscribed from exercising review over an extensive array of removal decisions,
including challenges to the denial of discretionary relief or to the removal of
268

See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
See Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative State, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1426, 1448–51 (2013); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REV. 29, 52–53, 56, 63 (1985).
270
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
271
See supra notes 81, 83 and accompanying text.
272
Concededly, other statutory provisions lend support for the contrary position, that Congress intended
for removal proceedings to be subject to a degree of political control. The INA provides that IJs are appointed
by and “shall be subject to such supervision and shall perform such duties as the Attorney General shall
prescribe.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2012). It further vests the power to grant discretionary relief from removal
personally in the Attorney General, not in IJs. See supra note 84–86 and accompanying text.
273
See generally Amanda Frost, Independence and Immigration, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 485, 507 (2016).
274
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE LEGAL AND PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF PRIVATE IMMIGRATION
LEGISLATION AND RECENT POLICY CHANGES (2017).
275
462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983).
276
See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707, 711, 731–32 (1893) (sustaining a
requirement that Chinese aliens produce a white witness to testify to their lawful presence to challenge removal).
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criminal aliens.277 The limited role of Congress and federal courts in disciplining
Executive decisions to deport noncitizens makes internal checks on Executive
power all the more important. These factors suggest that overall, presidential
politics should play little role in removal proceedings.
At a more granular level, however, the normative calculus differs across
different forms of political intervention.278 Perhaps counterintuitively,
interventions that have the largest aggregate impact on decisional outcomes
arguably enjoy a stronger claim to legitimacy than some of the other
interventions. Both the INA279 and administrative law doctrine under Heckler v.
Campbell280 make clear that the Attorney General retains authority to announce
broadly applicable policies to which IJs must adhere. Attorney General Sessions’
announcement in In re A-B- that asylum generally should not be granted on the
basis of private criminal violence arguably presents the type of legislative factfinding that does not require an independent assessment of historical
adjudicative facts.281 This is not to say that this decision is legally correct as a
matter of constitutional or statutory interpretation, or that it is morally
defensible—in my view, it is not. But it does suggest that allowing the Attorney
General rather than unelected bureaucrats to make this policy decision more
closely reflects an appropriate allocation of power between political operatives
and the bureaucracy.282 Moreover, the blanket nature of the mandate enhances

277
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2012) (precluding judicial review over denials of discretionary
relief); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (same for removal orders involving criminal aliens). But see INS v. St. Cyr,
533 U.S. 289, 297–98, 302–03, 305 (2001) (construing statutory denial of judicial review over removal decisions
narrowly in light of constitutional concerns).
278
Legomsky, War on Independence, supra note 17, at 387 (noting that different forms of political
influence over adjudication raise different normative concerns).
279
8 U.S.C. § 1103(g) (2012).
280
461 U.S. 458 (1983); see supra notes 245–57 and accompanying text.
281
See supra notes 148–51 and accompanying text.
282
Importantly, the Attorney General’s actions in both In re A-B- and In re E-F-H-L- raise legitimacy
concerns separate and apart from any improper interference in agency adjudications. Unlike the policy at issue
in Heckler v. Campbell, the current Administration’s new asylum policies were announced through the referand-review mechanism rather than through the notice and comment rulemaking procedures of the APA. See 5
U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (requiring agencies to publish notice of proposed rulemaking in Federal Register and offer
public opportunity to comment before promulgation of new regulation). The Supreme Court in Campbell
emphasized the importance of notice-and-comment procedures to ensure the factual accuracy of the challenged
agency decision. 461 U.S. at 470. The Attorney General’s decisions in In re A-B- and In re E-F-H-L- depart
significantly from those procedures. In In re A-B-, notice did not appear in the Federal Register, and public
comments were accepted through amicus briefs only. See In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. 227, 227 (A.G. 2018). In In re
E-F-H-L-, no prior notice or opportunity to comment was provided at all. See In re E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. 226,
226 (A.G. 2018). The Attorney General’s use of the refer-and-review mechanism circumvented the careful
deliberation and thorough explanation that notice-and-comment procedures would have provided, thereby
compromising the legitimacy of those decisions.
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uniformity and, given its relative public salience, is more likely to be held to
public account.283
At the other end of the spectrum, efforts to pressure individual IJs to reach
particular outcomes in a given case—such as by threatening negative
performance reviews, casting aspersions on the credibility of certain types of
witnesses or certain types of claimants, or the hiring or firing of IJs on the basis
of ideology—demonstrate the gravest misallocation of authority between
political leadership and bureaucracy. Few would doubt that such efforts
compromise the impartiality of adjudicators, thereby violating due process
norms. Such interventions in individual cases depart furthest from statutory
directives vesting the power to adjudicate removal proceedings in IJs and raise
precisely the sorts of concerns addressed in cases like Chadha and Accardi. At
the same time, they are not likely to improve uniformity and are far less publicly
salient.
Between these two extremes lie interventions relating to the procedures used
in removal proceedings, such as the denial of the power to grant administrative
closure, limiting the power to grant continuances, or directives to adjudicate
cases within a particular time frame.284 Arguably such interventions constitute
precisely the types of managerial controls we would demand of any
organization. The systematic failure to resolve cases in a timely manner not only
increases costs to the system but also harms noncitizens, particularly detained
noncitizens, who seek an efficient system to review their claims to relief from
removal.285
But as articulated in the previous section, it is virtually impossible to separate
these dictates from the Administration’s stated preference for reaching particular
outcomes—i.e., maximizing the number of deportations as quickly as possible,
a directive at odds with the independence of hearing-level adjudicators. The
283
See ASIMOW, supra note 54, at 17–18 (discussing importance of uniformity for perceptions of
legitimacy); Krent & Morris, supra note 198 (same).
284
Others similarly have noted the difficulty in distinguishing between different types of political
influence over adjudication. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies, supra note 21, at 1299–1300
(stating that one could not “reasonably quarrel with [the] view that the congestion of the dockets of the agencies
[and] the delays incident to the disposition of cases . . . are all a part of the President’s constitutional concern to
see that the laws are faithfully executed . . . . [Yet] I still find difficulty in the proposal that the President should
not merely see to it that agencies function but should tell them how”); see also Legomsky, War on Independence,
supra note 17, at 385, 387 (distinguishing “decisional independence” involving interference with individual case
outcomes from “institutional independence” involving interference with the overall process of adjudication but
acknowledging they “cannot always be separated neatly”).
285
See Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204, slip op. at 5–7 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2018) (involving plaintiffs
detained over a year pending removal decisions).
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pressure to speed up case resolution obstructs the noncitizen’s ability to present
his or her case or obtain counsel, compromises the IJ’s ability to engage in an
accurate assessment of the facts at issue, and, in the end, risks denying relief to
unknown numbers of noncitizens notwithstanding their legal eligibility for such
relief. Importantly, there are numerous alternatives to address the backlog in
case processing in removal proceedings.286 Indeed, EOIR commissioned a study
to identify such solutions, which concluded that if performance reviews were to
be utilized at all, they should emphasize fair process and independence rather
than quotas and deadlines.287 Rather than limiting the time judges can spend on
a given case, the agency could continue to hire more judges but ensure that such
hiring is conducted in a non-partisan manner, improve working conditions for
these judges, and expand access to counsel, reforms that would address the
backlog while not tilting decisional outcomes in favor of removal.288 While
measures to ensure the efficient resolution of cases are permissible, those that
stack the deck in favor of a preferred case outcome unduly compromise the
independence and integrity of adjudicative proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Administrative law scholars have long documented the emergence of
presidential control over agencies engaged in Executive and Legislative
functions, but they have generally assumed that such control does not extend to
administrative adjudication. The Trump Administration’s recent reforms to
immigration courts challenge that assumption. Through a series of mechanisms,
the Administration has eliminated IJs’ ability to administratively close cases,
limited the availability of asylum, discouraged the release of aliens from
detention, and imposed significant restrictions on IJs’ ability to carefully
consider and deliberate on cases. This Article contextualizes these reforms
within the extant debate over the legitimacy of presidential control over
agencies, with the ultimate goal of informing future efforts to reconcile tensions
between norms of political accountability and protections for individual due
process interests, and between regulatory efficiency and bureaucratic
independence.
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See, e.g., Strengthening and Reforming America’s Immigration Court System: Hearing Before the
Senate Judiciary Comm., Border Sec. & Immigration Subcomm., 115th Cong. 2, 8–9, 11–12 (2018) (statement
of Judge A. Ashley Tabaddor, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges) (attributing backlog to overall lack
of resources, including the number of IJs and technology utilized in the courts), https://www.naij-usa.org/
images/uploads/publications/NAIJ_Senate_Final_Testimony_4.18_.2018_.pdf.
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